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TAXABILITY OF GAIN RESULTING FROM REDUCTION OF LIABILITIES
THE taxpayer purchased a fleet of ships and in partial payment therefor gave
$608,400 in serial notes secured by a mortgage on the fleet. Two years later a now
contract was executed between vendor and purchaser whereby the latter was allowed
to repurchase its notes at a cost substantially below their face value. Through
this contract the taxpayer in 1924 reduced its indebtedness for $77,100 less than
the face of the debt, and in 1925 for $81,300 less. The Commissioner of Internal
Revenue treated these sums as taxable income with the result that a loss of
$100,338.25 reported in the taxpayer's 1924 income returns was lowered to $23,238.25
and a taxable gain in 1925 of $5,633.58 was converted into taxable gain of $63,695.33.
Evidence was introduced at a hearing before the Board of Tax Appeals1 to prove
that the fleet had shrunk in market value by an amount greater than the total saving
realized in the discharge of the notes at less than par.2 Upon this evidence the
Board held that these sums had been erroneously included as income by the Com-
missioner since the final outcome of the transaction was a loss and since in essence
the transaction amounted to a reduction in the purchase price of the fleet. This
decision was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals on the ground that the con-
tract between vendor and purchaser was concerned "solely about the notes and
their value and not about the ships or their value," so that the transaction was
purely one reducing indebtedness and not one involving a subsequent determination
of purchase price.8
Net taxable income is computed annually by subtracting from gross receipts,
derived from any source, certain deductions for expenses and losses incurred in
the regular operations of the business. 4 The court, in attempting to ascertain
when a given transaction has resulted in taxable income, ordinarily has regard for
substance rather than form,5 and rests its conclusion upon whether from a practical
point of view the business has experienced an increase in net worth or has realized
what is generally understood by the word "gain."6 Thus the purpose of the income
1. Coastwise Transportation Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 22 B. T. A.
373 (1931) ; second hearing, 28 B. T. A. 725 (1933).
2. Total saving realized through cancellation of the notes amounted to $158,400, while
depreciation of the ships in two years was calculated to be $184,080.27.
3. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Coastwise Transportation Corp., 71 F. (2d) 104
(C. C. A. 1st, 1934).
4. 43 STAT. 267 (1924), 26 U. S. C. A. § 953 (1928).
5. U. S. Treas. Reg. 77, Art. 41 (a) (1932). In Merchants' L. and T. Co. v. Smletanla,
255 U S. 509 (1921), it was said, at p. 519, "In determining the definition of the word
"income" thus arrived at, this court has consistently refused to enter into the refinements
of lexicographers or economists and has approved, in the definition quoted, what Is
believed to be the commonly understood meaning of the term which must have been In
the minds of the people when they adopted the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
See also Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 206 (1920).
6. "'Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both
combined,' provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion
of capital assets ... Here we have the essential matter: not a gain accruing to capital, not
a growth or increment of value in the investment; but a gain, a profit, something of ex-
changeable value, proceeding from the property, severed from the capital however invested
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tax is to exact payment in accordance with ability to withstand the burden of such
payment.7 Accordingly, the saving realized through retirement of outstanding bonds
at a cost below their par value has been called taxable income, since a decrease in
liabilities has the same effect in increasing net worth as does an increase in assets.8
And it must be conceded that in many instances either event will increase ability to
pay taxes. But it is important to bear in mind that not every discharge of indeb-
edness results in "severable," "realizable" gain, nor even in ability to discharge another
obligation. Where, through a composition of creditors or by bankruptcy proceed-
ings, the taxpayer is relieved of his liabilities, it is hardly arguable that he is there-
fore enabled to pay a tax on the amount that his liabilities are reducedP This
fact is artfully given recognition through a treasury regulation whereby the creditor
is said to be the recipient of a "gift" from his creditors and therefore exempt from
the income tax provisions.' 0
On three occasions the Supreme Court has been confronted with the general prob-
lem of when to tax under the Revenue law the discharge of liability effected at
less than face value; but from the language used on those occasions there still
remains an uncertainty as to how a situation such as presented by the instant case
should be regarded. In the Kerbaugh case,'" the taxpayer borrowed from the
Deutche Bank about two million dollars, which sum was subsequently invested by
a subsidiary in some unsuccessful construction projects and totally lost. In 1921
the taxpayer repaid its debt to the Deutche Bank in depreciated marks, realizing a
saving of almost $700,000. The Supreme Court held that this saving was not
taxable income because the result of the whole transaction was a loss, that "a mere
or employed, and coming in, being "derived," that is received or drawn by the recipient
(the taxpayer) for his separate use, benefit and disposal;-hat is income derived from
property. Nothing else answers the description." Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 1S9,
207 (1920). "The income or profit of a given period may be defined as the increase in
proprietorship which has taken place during that period, making due allowance for any
part of such increment as may have been distributed." HATrrrn, Accou.rrC; (1928) 241.
7. "Adam Smith, in his WE.LTH or NATIoNS, formulated four principles of taxation that
have since become classic in the field of Public Finance. According to Smith: '(1) The
subjects of every state ought to contribute to the support of the government, as nearly as
possible in proportion to their respective abilities."' Hvmrr, THE Drazro:. or I:xcazx
Axn ITs ApParcA~uoN ne Fzi ax E. TAxsAio (1928) 81-85.
8. "If, however, the corporation purchases and retires any of such bonds at a price lss
than the issuing price or face value, the excess of the issuing price or face value over the
purchase price is gain or income for the taxable year." U. S. Treas. Reg. 77, .Art. 6S (1)
(c) (1932).
See Comment (1930) 40 YALE L. J. 960 for an accounting analysis of the propoition
that the net effect of repurchasing bonds below par "is a reduction of liabilities accompanied
by a corresponding increase in net worth." See also Wakefield, Gain on Retirement of
Bonds Issued for Property (1933) 11 TAx MwAZI~m 249.
9. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Simmons Gin Co., 43 F. (2d) 327 (C. C. A.
10th, 1930); Burnet v. John F. Campbell Co., 50 F. (2d) 487 (App. D. C. 1931); Dallas
Transfer and Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 70 F. (2d) 95
(C. C. A. 5th, 1934); leyer Jewelry Co., 3 B. T. A. 1319 (1926); Towers and Sullivan Co.,
25 B. T. A. 922 (1932).
10. "The cancellation and forgiveness of indebtedness may amount to a payment of
income, to a gift, or to a capital transaction, dependent upon the circumstances." U. S.
Treas. Reg. 77 Art. 64 (1932); 1 STaxNssw Fmo. TAx SmVxcer, par. 77.04.
11. Bowers v. Kerbaugh Empire Co., 271 U. S. 170 (1926).
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diminution of loss is not gain, profit, or income."1' 2 Five years later in United Stales
v. Kirby Lumber Company,13 where the taxpayer issued its bonds for cash and
later in the same year repurchased and retired some of them at a price below their
face value, the court held that taxable gain had been realized to the extent of the
difference between the par value of the bonds and the repurchase price. In dis-
tinguishing the Kerbaugh case, Mr. Justice Holmes remarked that "here there was
no shrinkage of assets and the taxpayer made a clear gain.' 4 In the American
Chicle Company case,1 5 it was decided, again in the absence of any evidence of
losses, that a taxpayer who in part payment for the assets of another corporation
contracted to assume that corporation's bonded indebtedness and who subsequently
retired those bonds at a price below their face value must pay an income tax on the
difference between the par value of the bonds and the price at which they were
retired.
Thus the Court has indicated that where there has been a reduction in obligation,
but also a corresponding loss resulting from the same transaction, no taxable gain
would be deemed to result therefrom. But it is not clear what is meant by "cor-
responding loss." In the Kerbaugh case liability was excused by virtue of a loss,
through business transactions, of the asset giving rise to the obligation, Subse-
quently it has been pointed out that these same losses previously were or could
have been used as an offset against otherwise taxable income. And since to say that
the same losses now again avoid liability for an otherwise taxable transaction is in
effect to permit a second deduction of the same loss, the holding of the Kerbaugh
case has been severely criticized. 16 But this same criticism cannot be directed against
the loss claimed to exist in the present case. The loss in the present case is claimed
to result either from an originally mistaken concept of value, or from a subsequent
change due to general market trends or to the condition of the particular business.
Since the asset is still owned and used by the corporation, it might be legally diffi-
cult to say that any of these factors have caused a loss; for it is ordinarily said that
12. The Kerbaugh-Empire Company decision, notwithstanding the treasury regulation,
was interpreted by the Board of Tax Appeals in subsequent cases to mean that no discharge
of indebtedness below par is taxable income, even when corresponding losses are not
present. To almost every decision of the Board on this point the tax Commissioner pro-
tested. See Comment (1930) 40 YLz L. J. 960; cases cited note 3, supra.
13. 284 U. S. 1 (1931).
14. After this decision the Board of Tax Appeals reversed its former stand, (see note 12
supra) and held a reduction of indebtedness realized through repurchase of bonds below
par to be taxable income in the following cases: Consolidated Gas Co. of Pittsburg, 24
B. T. A. 901 (1931) (At p. 905 it was said: "The scope of the decision in the Kerbaugh.
Empire Co. case is not as broad as was thought in deciding the line of cases beginning
with Independent Brewing Co. of Pittsburg, 4 B. T. A. 870, and that line of cases Is no
longer authority for a situation such as exists in this case"); Woodward Iron Company, 24
B. T. A. 1050 (1931); Suncrest Lumber Co., 25 B. T. A. 375 (1932); Norfolk Southern
Rr. Co., 25 B. T. A. 925 (1932); Twin Ports Bridge Co., 27 B. T. A. 346 (1932); Garland
Coal and Mining Co., 28 B. T. A. 348 (1933). See also, Comment (1932) 20 CAMn. L.
REv. 441, for good discussion of the effect of this case upon the rule of the Kerbaugh decision.
15. Helvering v. American Chide Co., 54 S. Ct. 460 (1934). See Developments in the
Law-Taxation (1934) 47 HARv. L. REv. 1259: "However, the language of the American
Chicle case suggests that on an ampler record the court would have limited its scrutiny to
the particular transaction out of which the debt arose."
16. Rottschaefer, The Concept of Income in Federal Taxation (1929) 13 MINx. L. RLy.
637, 661; Note (1932) 6 U. or CiNx. L. REv. 357.
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regardless of bookkeeping adjustments, until an asset has been sold or otherwise
disposed of, no gain or loss can be realized thereupon.' 7  Recognized methods of
disposal are restricted to sale, exchange, abandonment or destruction; the function
of such restriction being to prevent a placing of reliance on a gain or loss until
it has had an actual irrevocable effect on the owner.' 8 Accountants, also, are in
general agreement that changes in the market value of fixed assets should not b2
reflected in the balance sheet since such changes do not affect the value of the
asset to the "going concern." 19  Obviously a mere change in market value, even
though accompanied by a corresponding adjustment of book values to change cor-
respondingly items of net worth and depreciation, could not be considered as irre-
vocably affecting a business; consequently it is not difficult to bear with the ac-
countants in their argument that annual reappraisals of fixed assets would be higbly
impractical and of doubtful advantage.! But where such change in market value
has been accompanied by a bookkeeping adjustment and there has been, because
of the change, a corresponding change in external liability, the effect upon the
owner has thus been made irrevocable and final 21 For example, when a transac-
tion simultaneously effects a reduction in the book value of an asset and a corre-
sponding reduction in the offsetting liability, these two entries appearing on the
books, there would seem to be no doubt as to the economic effect of the transaction
on the operating business, regardless of the language used by the parties in nego-
tiations leading to the bargain. The Income Tax Statute affords a method of realizing
a shrinkage in market value of the fleet by providing that the fleet may be sold
and the resulting loss be taken as an offset against the income realized by discharging
the liability.' 7 In the present case, when the value of the fleet is reduced on the
books and at the same time obligations founded thereon are correspondingly re-
duced, the effective cost price of the asset becomes just as irrevocably fixed as
though the asset had been sold and replaced at the lower price level, the loss thereby
realizsd and used to offset the gain from cancellation of the notes. The Board of
Tax Appeals recognized this fact by holding that "the transactions merely amounted
to a reduction in the purchase price of the fleet of vessels, that there was no release
17. Sec. 101 (Revenue Act of 1932) (c) (1) and (2). (1) "Capital gain" means taxable
gain from the sale or exchange of capital assets .. ." (2) "Capital loss means deductible
loss resulting from the sale or exchange of capital assets."
18. Cf. HAIG, THE FEDERAL INcomm TA. (1921) 137-159.
19. "Changes in the market value of an absolutely fixed aszet are generally ignored
on the ground that such changes do not affect the value to the going concern." Hwrmw,
Accou rNrG (1928) 76.
"Capital has become tied up in certain equipment essential to the undertaking, in the
sense that to dispose of it in its entirety would mean a break-up of the businez_ ...
Accordingly, the possible market value, as second-hand property, should not in any way
influence the valuation at which this group of assets is carried on the books. Only full
cost at the time of installation and depreciation, using the term in its broad sense, need 1:3
considered in the problem of valuation." 2 KEs=, Accou-xrro (2d ed. 1925) 301.
20. H w=zr, op. cit. supra note 7, at 81-85.
21. See Amomo a Y, FmRAL TAx HuMOOZ (1932) 225: "By analogy we find
support for the statement that when a transaction as a whole results in a los there can
be no taxable gain. Indeed, this is the position taken by the U. S. Supreme Court in
Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co. Many railroad bonds are selling today at l-s than 10
per cent of their face. Congress is being urged to supply funds to enable the roads to buy in
their bonds. If the discharge of debts at a discount always gives rise to a taxable profit,
the apparent gain to the roads would be wiped out by the payment of taxes. But it it
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of free assets by the transactions involved .... '"2 Such a statement is a legal con-
clusion that accurately describes the effect of the transaction.
It is questionable, however, whether the rule of the Kerbaugh decision, from which
the method suggested by the instant case of realizing a shrinkage in asset value
derives its precedent, retains its original validity in view of Burnet v. Sanford and
Brooks.m In that case, the taxpayer was taxed by the commissioner on a money
judgment which had been granted by the court admittedly to compensate the tax-
payer for losses suffered in the preceding four years. The Supreme Court affirmed
the tax on the ground that a year is the basic tax period and paid little heed to the
taxpayer's argument that according to the Kerbaugh decision, the transaction should
be regarded in its entirety and losses suffered in the preceding years should be
taken into account. If this decision, as some commentators believe, 24 confines
the Kerbaugh case to its own facts and declares a rule that each year's transactions
must be considered separately, then it might be that the method proposed in the
instant case could only apply if the reduction of indebtedness occurred within the
year of purchase. Indeed, the method might prove unworkable because of the
insurmountable difficulties that would accompany reopening of tax returns of past
years to determine what past depreciation charges should have been in the light
of the new cost figure. It might also be, by reason of still other limitations which
suggest themselves, that as a matter of administrative policy such a method of
treating a shrinkage in asset values would prove impractical. For example, in a
case where no shrinkage in market value has been suffered, nothing would be accom-
plished by allowing the corporation to write down its asset and thus obscure its true
financial position. Moreover, if economic effect is to be a criterion, it is difficult
to limit this method of realizing a shrinkage in asset value to those cases where a
particular asset is offset against the liability that is reduced, the only observable
difference between such a case and one where the gain from a cancellation of an
obligation would go to reduce the cost of some entirely unrelated asset being one of
form. The economic effect is identical. But although the latter practice is directly
forbidden, the former does have some sanction from the Kerbaugh, Kirby, and
American Chicle cases. The Circuit Court can not, however, be criticized for giving
no consideration to this possible method of realizing a shrinkage in value of an asset
if it was not contended for by the taxpayer. Nevertheless, if the purpose of the
Income tax is to require payment according to economic ability to make such pay-
ment, it is difficult to see how the nature of the contract subsequently made between
vendor and purchaser, upon which the court seems to turn its decision,25 is of more
than formal significance; for it could be varied to suit the needs at hand regardless
of the true nature of the transaction.
apparent that railroad bonds sell at a fraction of face value because the assets back of the
bonds have shrunk in the same degree as the market prices of the bonds. Hence, there can
be no taxable profit. The same principle applies to compositions with creditors. It is safe
to assume that there would he no compositions were there no corresponding shrinkage In
the worth of assets."
See HAiG, THE FEDERAL INcoanE TAX (1921) 12-15, for a presentation of the factors
involved in the question of whether a capital gain should be recognized for tax purposes
before the asset is sold or disposed of. See Also Sweeney, Income (1933) 8 TnxE AccouNT-
nTo REvImw 323; Note (1933) 11 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 269.
22. 28 B. T. A. 725, 730 (1933).
23. 282 U. S. 359 (1931).
24. Altman, Net Losses and the Taxable Year (1933) 28 ILL. L. REV. 525; MONToGOMRY,
FEDERAL TAX HAsnaoor, (1932) 64; (1932) 45 HAuv. L. Ray. 744.
25. 71 F. (2d) 104, 105 (C. C. A. 1st, 1934).
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ADIIINISTRATIVE DiSCRETON AND THE LoWEST RESPoNsIBL:E BIDDEn
To mAxn provision for judicial review of administrative abuses is both a philosoph-
ical and a practical necessity in states which adhere to the ideal classically e.xpressed
as "a government of laws and not of men." It is the duty of the courts to see that
public officials abide by the laws enacted for their governance, and it is the right of
the citizen to be protected against a governmental representative who transcends the
power lawfully his. Yet at the same time the courts have been influenced by the
opposing ideal of the separation of powers. The Supreme Court particularly has
shown fear of trespassing upon the executive sphere, and although it early declared
its power to hold public officers to their duty, it simultaneously distinguished
ministerial acts, performance of which might be compelled by mandamus, from
political or discretionary acts, into which the courts would not pry save to discover
fraud, oppression, or arbitrariness.' This distinction has been widely followed by
state courts,2 but it is too vague a rule to furnish a dear guide in particular cases.
In general the judiciary retains a broad power to review administrative action, but
it retains equally broad avenues of escape from the investigation of unwelcome factual
set-ups.3
The field of governmental supply or construction contracts is an interesting
illustration of the way in which the courts go about their task of checking venality
or injustice without at the same time clogging the wheels of governmenL 4 In such
contracts the procedure of award is usually prescribed with some rigidity. For the
federal government it is detailed by statute,5 supplemented by the regulations of the
various departmental heads.6 For the states it is fixed by statute or constitutional
provision.7 Municipalities or other local administrative bodies are controlled either
by general statute, or by municipal charter, or by special ordinance 8  While the
wording and interpretation of this legislation varies, it ordinarily requires that con-
tracts shall be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder. It is universally recognized
that, through the term "responsible" or its equivalent, the choice is elevated from
1. Marbury v. Madison, S U. S. 137, 162-167 (1803); Kendall v. United States ex rel.
Stokes, 37 U. S. 524 (1838); Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U. S. 497 (1840); United States ex
reL Dunlap v. Black, 128 U. S. 40 (188S); Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U. S. 627 (1913).
2. Duboise Construction Co. v. City of South Miami, 103 Fla. 362, 146 So. 833 (1933);
Peeples v. Byrd, 98 Ga. 688, 25 S. E. 677 (1896); Williams v. City of Top'dla, 85 Kan.
857, 118 Pac. 864 (1911); Willmott Coal Co. v. State Purchasing Comm!Lssion, 246 Ky.
115, 54 S. W. (2d) 634 (1932) ; Hallet v. City of Elgin, 254 Ill. 343, 98 N. E. 530 (1912) ;
Kratz v. City of Allentown, 304 Pa. 51, 155 At. 116 (1931); Gantenbda v. City of
Pasco, 71 Wash. 635, 129 Pac. 374 (1913).
3. Cf. Comment (1933) 33 Cor. L. REv. 104, at 109, n. 16: "In effect, refusal to review
discretion, at least in the absence of a definite statement of the grounds for its exerdcs, i3
merely disguised approval of the decision of the lower court on the merits. Similarly
review expresses disapproval." See also Dickinson, Judicial Control of Adn nisiralira
Discretion, (1928) 22 A.m POL. ScL Rxv. 275.
4. See Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U. S. 627, 632 (1913).
5. 36 STAT. 861 (1910); 41 U. S. C. A. § 5 (1926).
6. 5 U. S. C. A. § 22 (1926); Rxv. ST.,T. § 161 (1875).
7. See, for example, N. Y. STATE Pm rT. LAw (1917) § 4; As. G=r. Lws (1932) c.
7, § 22; ILL. CoNsr., art. IV, § 25.
8. See for example N. Y. SEc. Crass Crrras LAw (1909) § 120; Charter, City of New
Rochelle, § 143; Ordinances, City of New Haven, art. LX, § 64; cf. AsH, Gnz.', xn N=w
Yosx CHARTm, § 419 (special provisions for awarding the contract to other than the lowe-t
bidder by a three-fourths vote of Board of Estimate and Apportionment).
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the status of a purely mechanical task of following directions to that of a duty in-
volving an irreducible minimum of discretion.9 Upon this basis the courts have de,
veloped logical devices which leave them considerable freedom to interfere or not to
interfere. It is perhaps indicative of the flexibility of the mechanism that, although
it has furnished frequent excuse for abrogating the contracts of petty municipal
officials,10 it has seldom compelled the voidance of non-fraudulent state contracts,11
and has never been successfully invoked against federal contracts.
A recent federal case12 serves as an excellent example of the full use of the
machinery of avoidance. An unsuccessful bidder for a contract to supply materials
to the Federal Emergency Relief Administration sought an injunction against the
officials of that Administration to restrain the execution of a contract awarded to
another. The court refused the injunction on the grounds that, since the prescribed
method of award had been followed, the choice of a lowest responsible bidder was an
act requiring the exercise of a discretion beyond the power of the court to investi-
gate, and that the plaintiff had capacity to bring suit neither as a disappointed bidder
nor as a taxpayer.
The first great question generally in reviewing the grant of a governmental con-
tract is whether the legal method of award has been followed. Herein the public
official or administrative body has no discretion, and the courts do not condone even
slight irregularities. 13 An official need not necessarily accept the bid of the lowest
9. Wood Preserving Co. v. Sundmaker, 186 Fed. 678, (C. C. A. 6th, 1911). Awarding
of contract for construction, 33 Op. Att'y. Gen. 453 (1923); Duboise Construction Co. v.
City of South Miami, 108 Fla. 362, 146 So. 833 (1933); Hallet v. City of Elgin, 254 Ill.
343, 98 N. E. 530 (1912); Williams v. City of Topeka, 85 Kan. 857, 118 Pac. 864 (1911);
Board of Commissioners v. Davis, 92 Kan. 672, 141 Pac. 555 (1914); Bright v. Ball, 138
Miss. 508, 103 So. 236 (1925); Ellingson v. Cherry Lake School District, 55 N. D. 141, 212
N. W. 773 (1927); Gantenbein v. City of Pasco, 71 Wash. 635, 129 Pac. 374 (1913). See
Note (1912) 38 L. R. A. (N. s.) 672. Contra: Scott v. United States, 44 Ct. Cl. 524
(1909); Seysler v. Mowery, 29 Idaho 412, 160 Pac. 262 '(1916); Armitage v. Mayor and
Council of Newark, 86 N. J. Law 5, 90 Atl. 1035 (1914).
10. Adolphus v. Baskin, 95 Fla. 603, 116 So. 225 (1928) (voided as unreasonable ex.
ercise of discretionary power); Seysler v. Mowery, 29 Idaho 412, 160 Pac. 262 (1916)
(voided because, if contract is not awarded to lowest bidder, facts upon which administra-
tive decision has been based must be on record); Willmott Coal Co. v. State Purchasing
Commission, 246 Ky. 115, 54 S. W. (2d) 634 (1932) (though contract was not voided,
court asserted right to review administrative discretion); Armitage v. Mayor and Council
of Newark, 86 N. J. Law 5, 90 Atl. 1035 (1914) (voided because irregularly given to one
not lowest bidder, on changing terms of contract without readvertisement); Miller v.
Mayor and Council of Hoboken, 90 N. J. LAw 167, 100 At. 216 (1917) (bidder had made
false statement to municipality); American Water Corp. v. Mayor and Council of Borough
of Florham Park, 139 Ad. 169 (N. J. 1927) (voided because lowest bidder was not given
opportunity to show his responsibility); Kratz v. City of Allentown, 304 Pa. 51, 155 Atl.
116 (1931) (voided for abuse of discretion in not making adequate investigation of low
bid); City of Austin v. McCall, 95 Tex. 565, 68 S. W. 791 (1902) (voided because ultra
vires act).
11. Ellison v. Oliver, 147 Ark. 252, 227 S. W. 586 (1921) (contract voided for gross
irregularity in procedure); Mulnix v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co., 23 Colo. 71, 46
Pac. 123 (1896) (same); Hopper v. Fagan, 151 Ark. 428, 236 S. W. 820 (1922) (gross
irregularities in award); State v. Cornell, 52 Neb. 25, 71 N. W. 961 (1897).
12. O'Brien v. Carney, 6 F. Supp. 761 (D. Mass. 1934).
13. See cases cited in footnotes 10 and 11 supra.
responsible bidder; but if the bid is rejected, it is not permissible then to grant the
contract to another. Often the whole procedure must be again followed until a
suitable lowest responsible bidder appears and is accepted.
1 4 Such an insistence,
however, is no mere formalism, for investigation of the circumstances behind each
irregularity would involve the courts in a continual inquiry concerning the un-
warranted exercise of a discretion on its face suspicious. The second question for
review involves an inquiry as to whether the public official, although following the
forms prescribed, has exercised a legitimate discretion. If it should clearly appear
that the accepted bidder was not the lowest responsible bidder, the contract is of
course void.1 5 If it appears that no effort was made to discover whether a re-
jected lowest bidder was truly responsible, or if a higher bidder had been chosen
without giving the lowest bidder the opportunity to offer proof of his responsibility,
0
the contract has sometimes been held to be abrogated. But if, as in the instant
case, there has been no blatant impropriety, the courts will generally not inquire
into the facts upon which the public official's decision was based, or into the validity
of an objection based on a contractor's past record. 17 If discretion has been exercised
the courts are reluctant to pass upon the quality of that discretion.
As manifested in the present case, the several legal conceptions centering about
the plaintiff's capacity to bring suit provides an even more efficacious escap-a from
the necessity of review than the distinction between discretionary and non-discretion-
ary functions. The doctrine that an individual may seek relief in equity from wrong-
ful actions of a municipal corporation to which he pays taxes 8 has given the courts
a useful check upon these notoriously unreliable smaller units of governments, while
the absence of an analagous doctrine for the federal and most state governments
has saved the courts from the necessity of many decisions politically embarrassing
or judicially unwise.19 Only the proper public official may bring suit against the
14. Scott v. United States, 44 Ct. CI. 524 (1909); St. Landry Lumber Co. v. Town of
Bunkie, 155 La. 892, 99 So. 687 (1909); Molloy v. City of New Rochelle, 198 N. Y. 402, 92
N. E. 94 (1910). Contra: Sanitary District of Chicago v. McMabon & Montgomery Co.,
110 Ill. App. 510 (1903).
15. Miller v. City of Des Moines, 143 Iowa 409, 122 N. W. 226 (1909); Holden v. City
of Alton, 179 Ii. 318, 53 N. E. 556 (1S99); Davenport v. Walker, 57 App. Div. 221,
68 N. Y. Supp. 16 (3rd Dept, 1901); State v. State Office Buildings' Commisson, 124
Ohio St. 413, 179 N. E. 138 (1931).
16. Kelley v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Essex Co., 90 N. J. L= 411, 101 At. 422
(1917); American Water Corp. v. Mayor and Council of Borough of Florham Park, 139
At. 169 (N. J. 1927).
17. Duboise Construction Co. v. City of South Miami, 10 Fla. 362, 146 So. 833 (1933);
Peeples v. Byrd, 98 Ga. 688, 25 S. E. 677 (1896); Williams v. City of Top2ha, 85 Ran.
857, 118 Pac. 864 (1911); Board of Commissioners v. Davis, 96 Kan. 672, 141 Pac. S55
(1914); Kratz v. City of Allentown, 304 Pa. 51, 155 Ad. 116 (1931).
18. Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U. S. 601 (1879); Adolphus v. Baskln, 95 Fla. 603,
116 So. 225 (1928); City of Austin v. McCall, 95 Texas 565, 68 S. W. 791 (1902); cf.
Talcott v. City of Buffalo, 125 N. Y. 280, 26 N. E. 263 (1891); Madden v. Van Wycl, S
Misc. Rep. 645, 72 N. Y. Supp. 135 (Sup. Ct. 1901).
19. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 486 (1923); Sanders v. Balhrd, 160 Ga.
366, 127 S. E. 851 (1925); Pierce, County Commissioner v. Smith, 48 Kan. 331, 29 Pac.
565 (1892); Sutton v. Buie, 136 La. 234, 66 So. 956 (1914); Miller v. Grandy, 13 Mich.
540, 550 (1865); Asplund v. Hannett, 31 N. Mex. 641, 249 Pac. 1074 (1926); Olmstead v.
Meahl, 219 N. Y. 270, 114 N. E. 393 (1916); Jones v. Reed, 3 Wash. 57, 27 Pac. 1057
(1891); State v. Clausen, 146 Wash. 588, 264 Pac. 403 (1928). Contra: Turnipseed v. Blan,
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officer of a sovereignty for a purely public wrong.20 Private individuals may sue only
for redress of private wrongs.2 ' A taxpayer as a taxpayer has no justiciable interest
in the wrongful acts of state or federal officials, 22 and the disappointed bidder
usually finds himself in no better circumstance. Practically all advertisements for
bids contain a clause reserving the right to reject any and all bids, thus removing
the possibility of the usual contractual remedies. The federal courts, at least for
federal contracts, have ruled out the possibility of a claim based upon statute by
deciding that the statutory procedure together with the departmental regulations
which declare that the award should be made to the lowest responsible bidder were
enacted solely for the protection of the public, conferring no rights upon the con-
tractor.23 This, it may be noted, is in marked contrast to the policy of several states
towards similar municipal or county regulations. Decisions in Louisiana and New
Jersey, for example, expressly recognize that the lowest responsible bidder has a
justiciable interest in an award, and may sue upon it, being entitled at least to
proof of his own unfitness. 24
In the instant case, which concerned a federal contract, there could of course be
no doubt that the plaintiff was unable to sue in the capacity of a contractor. It
would appear that his inability to sue as a taxpayer was also too well settled to be
very seriously urged. The fact that the decision discussed several issues, any one
of which was sufficient for dismissal, is probably indicative of the court's intent
to close all avenues for such unwelcome suits in the future. An omission to do so
would be an invitation to a multitude of plausible actions that would rise to ob-
struct governmental administration with a mountain of litigation. The possible
private injustice done to a great number of contractors throughout the nation in
avoiding such suits would not outweigh the public injury and expense that would
be occasioned if every disappointed party could carry his grievance to the courts
in search of injunctive relief. Yet a categoric refusal to inquire into the actions of
public officials might have even more dire effects. It is the virtue and beauty of our
legal system that by the quiet use of a complicated verbal technique either extreme
is avoided.
226 Ala. 549, 148 So. 116 (1933); Fergus v. Russell, 270 Ill. 304, 110 N. E. 130 (1915);
Fischer v. Marsh, 113 Neb. 153, 202 N. W. 422 (1925); Burness v. Multnomah Co., 37
Ore. 460, 60 Pac. 1005 (1900); Page v. King, 285 Pa. 153, 131 Atl. 707 (1926); Whito
Eagle Oil Co. v. Gunderson, 48 S. D. 608, 205 N. W. 614 (1925).
20. Jones v. Reed, 3 Wash. 57, 27 Pac. 1067 (1891); State v. Clausen, 146 Wash. 588,
264 Pac. 403 (1928).
21. Sanders v. Ballard, 160 Ga. 366, 127 S. E. 851 (1925); Miller v. Grandy, 13 Mich.
540, 550 (1865); Asplund v. Hannett, 31 N. Mex. 641, 249 Pac. 1074 (1926).
22. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 486 (1923); Pierce, County Commissioner
v. Smith, 48 Kans. 331, 29 Pac. 565 (1892); Asplund v. Hannett, 31 N. Mex. 641, 249 Pac.
1074 (1926); Olmstead v. Meahl, 219 N. Y. 270, 114 N. E. 393 (1916); Jones v. Reed, 3
Wash. 57, 27 Pac. 1067 (1891).
23. American Smelting and Refining Co. v. United States, 259 U. S. 75 (1922).
24. Fourmy v. Franklin, 126 La. 151, 52 So. 249 (1910); St. Landry Lumber Co. v,
Town of Bunkie, 155 La. 892, 99 So. 687 (1909); Maginnis v. City of Wildwood, 94 X. J.
Law 90, 108 Atl. 780 (1920); American Water Corp. v. Mayor and Council of Borough of
Florham Park, 139 Atl. 169 (N. J. 1927).
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POWER OF PROBATE COURT TO COMPEL ATTORNEY TO REFUND ExcEssIVE FEE
VOLUNTARILY PAID BY EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR
CUSTOMARILY, before entering into agreements with others or disbursing assets
of an estate in accordance therewith, an executor or administrator seeks the sanction
of the probate court. He may, however, adopt the alternative course; that is, he
may first transact the business, expecting later to receive the approval of the court.
If he fails in gaining this approval and if he has made payments out of the funds
of the estate,' he or his surety is accountable for the money so appropriated; 2 and
if he has paid out of his own pocket, he cannot expect to be reimbursed for his
unauthorized expenditure.3 Similarly, the fiduciary who pays money to his counsel
without first obtaining an order of the probate court is generally held to do so at
his own risk.4 If the court subsequently chooses to recognize his expenditure as
proper, he is absolved from any liability for overpayment; 5 otherwise he is per-
sonally responsible to the estate for any amount over and above the reasonable
allowance for attorneys' fees decreed by the court.0 Of course, the representative
is personally bound by the contracts that he makes with others, 7 but it would be
most unfortunate if the estate were also under a duty to fulfill all the undertakings
made by him in its behalf, without regard to their improvidence.8
1. New York permits payment to be made for legal services directly out of the funds
in the custody of the personal representative. N. Y. SU. CT. Acr (1920) § 222.
2. Matter of Gilman's Administratrix, 251 N. Y. 265, 167 N. E. 437 (1929).
3. In re O'Reilly, 27 Ariz. 222, 231 Pac. 916 (1925); Johnson v. Telford, 3 Ru-. 477
(Ch. 1827); Brown v. Burdett, 40 Ch. D. 244 (1888).
4. "The administratrix, therefore, was acting within her rights if she disbur-ed the
moneys of the estate for reasonable and necescary expenses (here attorney's fees), though
in advance of her accounting. She took the risk, however, that a surcharge would follow,
if the expenses were disallowed as improper or excessive.' Cardozo, C. J., in Matter of
Gilman's Administratrix, 251 N. Y. 265, 271, 167 N. E. 437, 440 (1929).
5. Mlacnamara v. Jones, Dick. 587 (Ch. 1784); 2 Wnuzxms, Ex.ECUToRs (Parry &
Cherry, 12th ed. 1930) 1219.
6. In Sprinkle v. Forrester, 162 TII. App. 45, 47 (1911), it %was aid: "The right of the
county court to allow to an executor or administrator credit in his account for reasonable
attorney's fees paid to an attorney at law for services in enabling such executor or admin-
istrator to properly and efficiently perform the duties of his office is undoubted, but the
amount so paid for attorney's fees is to be determined by the court in the exercise of a
judicial discretion. When items for which an executor or administrator asks credit in his
report are disallowed in whole or in part by the court, such executor or administrator
becomes personally liable to the estate for the amount of such items.'
7. 2 W iz, op. cit. supra note 5, at 1161 et seq.; 2 Wonum, Azrmae, L~wv or
Anarm i oX (3d ed. 1923) § 356; RESTATEET, TRusrs (Tent. Draft, 1933) §§ 253,
254. It may be possible for an executor or administrator to avoid personal liability by
expressly providing in his contracts that the estate alone is to be responsible. Brigs v.
Breen, 123 Cal. 657, 56 Pac. 633 (1899); Morehead Banking Co. v. Morehead, 116 N. C.
413, 21 S. E. 191 (1895) ; RESTATEMENT, TRusTs (Tent. Draft, 1933) § 255 (1).
8. Connecticut is unusual in providing that if a claim against an executor or adminis-
trator "shall be found to be a just one, and one which ought to be equitably paid out of
such estate, judgment may be rendered in favor of such claimant, to be paid wholly out
of the estate so held by such executor, administrator, guardian, or trustce" Co:-. G=.-.
3TAT. (1930) § 5640. However, it is said: "This statute does not change the nature of
the obligation incurred by an executor or administrator in the performance of his duties;
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Having made a payment to an attorney for services rendered to an estate, the
question arises as to the power of the fiduciary to recover from the attorney the
excess above the allowance permitted by the court for counsel fees. In a recent
New York case illustrative of this problem, an administratrix paid her attorney
$7,750 without first obtaining the approval of the surrogate. Thereafter the surro-
gate concluded that $5,000 would be a reasonable fee for the services, and summarily
directed the attorney to return to the estate the difference between the two sums.
On appeal it was held that the surrogate had no jurisdiction to compel a refund,
the matter being entirely a personal affair between the administratrix and her
attorney whereof it was the right of the attorney to have the claim against him
determined in a formal proceeding at law.9 It is to be noted that in consequence of a
recent amendment to the New York Decedent Estate Law, granting full jurisdiction
to the surrogate to compel a refund by the attorney,' 0 the present issue would no
longer be presented in New York.
There are few cases that directly decide whether or not a probate ,court has
power to compel the repayment by an attorney of an excessive fee paid to him
by a personal representative. Of the cases that exist, all in jurisdictions other than
New York are uniformly in accord with the present decision in denying such power.11
For it is said that since an attorney may not without statutory authority bring suit
directly against an estate for services rendered, because the determination of fees
is considered to be an issue solely between him and the fiduciary, therefore the
estate, as represented by its administrator or executor, ought not to be permitted
to demand from the attorney a refund of sums paid voluntarily to him.'" It would
seem that a decision of this nature ought to be placed upon broader grounds than
the fact that an attorney may not pursue his remedy against the estate itself.
Between him and the fiduciary exists the relationship of attorney and client, and
in accordance with the general principles governing that relation this issue should be
decided.
it merely affords the creditor a remedy by which, without injustice to the estate, the
obligation owed to him may be discharged immediately from the fund which In any
event would ultimately bear the burden." Hewitt v. Beattie, 106 Conn, 602, 614, 138
Atl. 795, 800 (1927).
9. Matter of Rosenberg, 263 N. Y. 357, 189 N. E. 452 (1934).
10. "In the event that any such attorney has already received or been paid a sum in
excess of the fair value of his services as thus determined, the surrogate shall have power
to direct him to refund such excess." N. Y. SuRR. CT. AcT (Supp. 1934) § 231-a.
11. Tomsky v. Superior Court, 131 Cal. 620, 63 Pac. 1020 (1901); Jackson v. Superior
Court, 210 Cal. 59, 290 Pac. 448 (1930); Sprinkle v. Forrester, 162 111. App. 45 (1911);
In re Sullivan's Estate, 36 Wash. 217, 78 Pac. 945 (1904). New York surrogates were
formerly of the opinion that the power to compel a refund by the attorney was conferred
upon them by § 40 of the Surrogate's Court Act, giving them general jurisdiction over
all matters of probate. See, for example, Matter of Strandburg, 138 Misc. Rep, 732, 247
N. Y. Supp. 194 (Surr. Ct., 1930), aff'd on rehearing, 138 Misc. Rep. 859, 248 N. Y. Supp.
164 (Surr. Ct. 1931); Matter of Duggan, 146 Misc. Rep. 596, 262 N. Y. Supp. 512 (Surr.
Ct. 1933); Matter of Balazs, 147 Misc. Rep. 95, 264 N. Y. Supp. 346 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
12. State ex rel. Cohen v. District Court, 53 Mont. 210, 212, 162 Pac. 1053, 1054
(1917). This argument would not be applicable in New York, where a surrogate i
empowered "to hear an application for and to fix and determine the compensation of an
attorney for services rendered to an estate or to its representative, or to a devisee, legatee,
distributee or any person interested therein," and the proceeding may be instituted "by
petition . . . of an attorney who has rendered services." N. Y. SuR. CT. AcT (1923)
§ 231-a.
There is at the outset the question as to whether the attorney could under the
present circumstances be compelled in an action at law instituted by the fiduciary
to make restitution of the excessive fee. When an attorney retains from moneys
of his client an unreasonable amount for his services, a court Will not hesitate to
consider the value of the performance rendered and require him to remit any
amount above a proper charge.l 3  But if the client, as here, has made a voluntary
payment, there is some doubt as to the power of a court to direct a refund,1 4 and
under ordinary conditions there is slight likelihood that it will, in the abzence of a
showing that the attorney has been lax or fraudulent in the execution of his duties.15
The present situation is unusual. In employing an attorney the personal representa-
tive is acting not primarily in his own interest but rather in the interest of the
estate, and by statute he is required to account for the expenditures he has made
during the course of administration. 16 If he has already paid for the legal services
rendered to him, in all probability he accepted the judgment of his attorney as to
the reasonableness of the charge. Accordingly, if thereafter the probate court
reaches the conclusion that the amount of the fee was not justified, it should be the
attorney rather than the fiduciary who ought ultimately to repay the excess.
Although the present decision does not necessarily deprive the administratrix
of her remedy at law, nevertheless to require her to suffer the expense, delay, and
trouble of an entirely new action "would be a postponement of justice equivalent
to a denial."'17 Probate jurisdiction, governed by statute, is never in express terms
so limited that it may not supervise the conduct of an attorney acting in behalf of
an estate. If the attorney assesses an unreasonable fee on the fiduciary, the probate
court should remove the burden of a surcharge from the shoulders of the fiduciary
and his sureties by assuming full power to compel the attorney to repay the excess.
Conceding that under these circumstances the court should have such jurisdiction,
13. Soper v. Manning, 147 Mass. 126, 16 N. E. 752 (1888); Burns v. Allen, 15 R. I.
32, 23 At]. 35 (1885). As the dissenting opinion in the present case observes, Matter of
Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 363, 189 N. E. at 454, the distinction is narrow between the
attorney who receives a voluntary payment from the personal representative and the one
who retains a certain sum for his fees out of funds collected by him, and yet on the one
hand the probate court is denied the power to compel a refund, supra note 11, whereas
on the other the power is sustained for the reason that the moneys in question, once having
been collected, become a part of the estate and thereafter remain within the jurisdiction
of the court until a formal order has been made for their disbursement. Matter of Dollar,
103 Misc. Rep. 137, 169 N. Y. Supp. 333 (Surf. Ct. 1918), aff'd, 194 App. Div. 948, 184
N. Y. Supp. 918 (3d Dep't, 1920), aff'd, sub nom. Matter of Hulett, 231 N. Y. S45, 132
N. E. 882 (1921); Matter of Anderson, 136 ]Hisc. Rep. 110, 240 N. Y. Supp. S32 (SumT.
Ct. 1930), rev'd on other grounds, 232 App. Div. 704, 247 N. Y. Supp. 1015 (2d Dep't,
1931), aff'd, 257 N. Y. 592, 173 N. E. 809 (1931).
14. In Matter of Hess, 133 App. Div. 654, 118 N. Y. Supp. 171 (1st Dep't, 1g09), the
executor sought in a court of law to compel his attorneys to repay a voluntary but
allegedly excessive fee. The court held that its disciplinary power ought not to be exerci-ed
to so great an extent. In Matter of Jeffries, 219 N. Y. 573, 114 N. E. 1070 (1916).
reported in a memorandum decision, the same conclusion was reached in a similar situation.
15. 2 Thoax oxr , ATT.oa xs AT LAW (1914) § 569.
16. See, for example, Cozm. G=T. STAT. (1930) §§ 4972-4976; N. J. Co-im. STAT. (1910)
pp. 3856, 3857; N. Y. SuRR. CT. AcT (1923) § 231-a; Omio GE2r. CODE (Page, Supp. 1931)
§ 10509-193; PA. STAT. AN'. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 20, § 2244.
17. Cardozo, C. J., in Matter of Raymond v. Davis, 248 N. Y. 67, 72, 161 N. E. 421,
423 (1928).
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in the exercise of that jurisdiction the court ought also to entertain summary pro-
ceedings. Where an attorney has money to which his client is, ex aequo et bono,
entitled, he may ordinarily be compelled in a summary action, as an officer of the
court and within its sound discretion, to make restitution.' 8 The case at hand appears
to be eminently suited to the extension by the probate court of this same form of
relief, for the amount to be recovered is certain and the right to a remedy should be
unquestioned.
BusINEss COMPULSION AS AN ESCAPE FRoM THE PAROL EvxDENCE RULE
IN order to procure funds from a finance company, officers of the defendant motor
car sales corporation required its salesmen, under threat of discharge, to purchase
new automobiles. The plaintiff salesman traded in his old car, entered into a con-
ditional sales contract,, and signed a promissory note only after receiving oral as-
surance that he would be saved harmless from any monetary loss he might thereby
suffer and that he need never pay the note. But the executed contract contained
a clause negativing all warranties, representations, and agreements not included
therein. Subsequently the plaintiff was discharged, and when the note was not met
at maturity, the finance company repossessed the car. In a suit to recover damages
for the loss resulting from the repossession of the car, it was held that, since the
plaintiff acted under business compulsion, the defendant's agreement to save plaintiff
harmless was admissible despite the parol evidence rule, and judgment was thereupon
granted for the plaintiff.1
The result reached is an unusual relaxation of the parol evidence rule. Only the
showing of fraud, accident, mistake, or duress may take a case out of the operation
of the well established doctrine that contemporaneous or prior oral agreements are
inadmissible when they tend to destroy, entirely 2 or substantially,3 the very obliga-
tion of a written instrument which shows on its face adequate consideration.4
Nevertheless, since the concept of business compulsion is regarded as an extension
of the common law rule of duress8 and accorded identical treatment in other types
18. 1 THORNTON, op. cit. supra note 15, §§ 354-356.
1. Champlin v. Transport Motor Co., 33 P. (2d) 82 (Wash. 1934).
2. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. United States Shipping Board, etc., 16 F. (2d)
847 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927); Richardson v. Merchants' and Planters' Bank & Trust Co., 188
Ark. 1104, 69 S. W. (2d) 396 (1934); Doyle v. Nesting, 37 Colo. 522, 88 Pac. 862 (1906);
Graham v. Savage, 110 Minn. 510, 126 N. W. 394 (1910); Security Savings Bank v.
Rhodes, 107 Neb. 223, 185 N. W. 421 (1921); Second National Bank of Reading v. Yeager,
268 Pa. 167, 111 Ad. 159 (1920); Bank of Hooversville v. Sagerson, 283 Pa. 406, 129 AU.
333 (1925); 5 WiGmoP, EvmNcE (2d ed. 1923) § 2435.
3. Kilgore v. Arant, 25 Ala. App. 356, 146 So. 540 (1933); Lompoc Valley Bank v.
Stephenson, 156 Cal. 350, 104 Pac. 449 (1909); State Bank of Ardock v. Burke, 53 N. D.
777, 208 N. W. 115 (1926); Myers v. Gibson, 304 Pa. 249, 155 AUt. 563 (1931).
4. This is especially true where there is a clause in the contract to the effect that the
writing contains the whole agreement between the parties and that any oral representations
or warranties are excluded. Harnischfeger Sales Corp. v. Sternberg Co., 179 La. 317, 154
So. 10 (1934); Gross v. Exeter Machine Works, 277 Pa. 363, 121 AtI. 195 (1923); Hauer
v. Martin, 284 Pa. 407, 131 Atl. 187 (1925); Hall v. Hall, 133 Wash. 400, 234 Pac. 2
(1925); Kelly Co. v. Von Zakobiel, 168 Wis. 579, 171 N. W. 75 (1919).
5. The term "business compulsion" has been used chiefly by the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington. See Duke v. Force, 120 Wash. 599, 621, 208 Pac. 67, 74 (1922); Alwen v. Tramon-
1934] NOTES 157
of legal situations, 6 it can also be invoked to avoid the parol evidence rule. But the
facts of the instant case are a drastic variation from the situations which have
hitherto been regarded as properly included in the category of business compulsion. 7
To constitute business compulsion, it is stated, there must be present the exaction
of an extortionate amount of moneys or an unconscionable contract under threat
to do an unfair if not an illegal act on the one side, and the choice between com-
plying with the unjust demand or possibly sacrificing a capital investment,1 o on the
other side. It is furthermore iterated that the mere fear of financial injury or
the existence of straitened circumstances is insufficient to constitute such duress,"
particularly where the other party is not responsible therefor.'
But no good reason appears why these rules, crystallized from past factual situa-
tions, should become fixed limitations upon the further extension of the duress
concept. The basis of that concept is the substantial coercion of a party's free
wilL That this underlying principle cannot be limited by rules in the form of
objective standards is illustrated by the growth of the business compulsion ex-
tension itself. And similarly, that extension may further be enlarged to fit cases
which meet the basic requirement of will coercion. In the light of the present economic
depression,13 it seems opportune, therefore, that the instant court should have
placed this species of high-powered persuasion within the ambit of business com-
pulsion. Although the plaintiff would have lost no conceptually acknowledged prop-
erty right,14 nevertheless, realistically, the fear of losing his job in a time of wide-
spread and general unemployment would have accomplished as much in overcoming
his free will as the possibility of financial ruin through loss of a large capital invest-
tin, 131 Wash. 78, 80, 228 Pac. 851, 852 (1924); Jacobson v. Nicholas, 155 Wash. 234, 237,
283 Pac. 684, 685 (1930). In other courts, the same concept is recognized by such phrass
as "moral duress," or "compulsion of circumstances" or "not technically duress." Se
Brown v. Worthington, 162 Mo. App. 503, 516, 142 S. W. 1032, 1034 (1912); Illinois
Merchants Trust Co. v. Harvey, 335 IM. 284, 289, 167 N. E. 69, 71 (1929); Harris v. Cary,
112 Va. 362, 369, 71 S. E. 551, 553, (1911); Note (1931) 79 A. L. R. 655.
6. Young v. Hoagland, 212 Cal. 426, 298 Pac. 996 (1931); Ferguson v. A.-odated 01
Co., 173 Wash. 672, 24 P. (2d) 82 (1933) (overcharge recovered).
7. This is perhaps evidenced by the seeming hesitancy of the court in the instant case
to ascribe its decision solely to that factor.
8. Union Pacific Rr. Co. v. Public Service Commiikon, 248 U. S. 67 (1918); Rowland v.
Watson, 4 Cal. App. 476, 88 Pac. 495 (1906) ; Redford v. Weller, 27 S. D. 334, 131 N. W.
296 (1911).
9. Sylvan Mortgage Co. v. Stadler, 113 Misc. 659, 185 N. Y. Supp. 293 (1920), noted
in (1921) 7 VA. L. REv. 396; Johnson v. Ford, 147 Tenn. 63, 245 S. W. 531 (1922); Ramp
Building Corp. v. Northwest Building Co., 164 Wash. 603, 4 P. (2d) 507 (1931), noted
in (1932) 7 WAsH. L. REv. 248.
10. Olympia Brewing Co. v. State, 102 Wash. 494, 173 Pac. 430 (1918); Sunset Copper
Co. v. Black, 115 Wash. 132, 196 Pac. 640 (1921); Jacobson v. Nicholas, 155 Wash. 234,
283 Pac. 684 (1930) (recovery denied because of no capital investment).
11. Morton v. Morris, 72 Fed. 392 (C. C. A. 8th, 1896) (financial crids insufficient as
a defense); Hackley v. Hadley, 45 Mich. 569, 8 N. W. 511 (1831); Bartlett v. Richardon
Co., 27 Ohio App. 263, 161 N. E. 403 (1927).
12. See French v. Shoemaker, 81 U. S. 314, 333 (1871).
13. For use of the novel argument of business depression, see Miller v. Eisele, 111 N. J.
Law 268, 282, 168 AUl. 426, 432 (1933), noted in (1934) 82 U. o' PA. L. REv. 259.
14. People v. Cuddihy, 151 Misc. 318 (N. Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1934) (mere relation be-
tween employer and employee not a property right).
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ment. Moreover, such an extension is especially advisable where it is helpful in
arriving at an equitable result by avoiding the harsh operation of the parol evidence
rule. This is quite in harmony with the underlying policy of many courts when,
as in the principal case, the oral evidence introduced is uncontradcted. 15
APPLICATION Or LAW OF RESIDENCE TO GovEPR SuiT AGAINST TORT FEASOR'S ESTATE
FOR FOREIGN TORT
TnE plaintiff and the defendant's testator, both residents of New York, were
motoring in Virginia when an accident occurred, allegedly due to the testator's
negligence, in which plaintiff was injured. Subsequently the testator died and his
last will was probated in New York with the defendants as duly qualified executors
thereof. By Virginia statute a cause of action for personal injuries survives the death
of the wrongdoer and is maintainable against his personal' representatives,' but by
New York law such an action abates on the death of the tort feasor." The plaintiff
brought suit in New York against the personal representative of the alleged tortfeasor
claiming that Virginia law should govern any cause of action growing out of the
Virginia accident. The New York Court of Appeals refused to recognize the claim
of the plaintiff and held that since New York alone had power to determine the
devolution and distribution of the property of a deceased resident its courts did not
have jurisdiction to entertain against the estate a suit based on Virginia' law.3
Since both parties to this suit were citizens of New York and governed in most of
their legal relations by New York law, and since it was only by a fortuitous circum-
stance that the operative facts occurred in Virginia, it does not seem entirely un-
reasonable from the layman's viewpoint that the rights of the parties should be
adjudicated by the law of their own residence. However, in personal injury cases
involving a conflict of laws, the residence of the parties has never been regarded as
a justifiable and proper basis for distinguishing results.4 Nor did the court here
seek to draw any such distinction. Hence the decision in the instant case, as well
as the reasoning by which the court reached this decision, would require that a
similar case in which the plaintiff was a resident of the foreign state be decided in
the same way. Such a result is undesirable both as a matter of judicial and political
policy.
While the liability of a tort feasor is usually said to be determined by the lex loci
15. This course is pursued even though it is criticized as emasculating the parol evldenco
rule and almost rendering the exception the rule. See Index Co. v. Wheeler, 81 Colo. 402,
408, 255 Pac. 982, 984 (1927); Greenawalt v. Kohne, 85 Pa. 369, 375 (1877).
1. VA. CODE _Aw. (Michie, 1930) § 5790.
2. N. Y. DEcEDENT EsT. LAw (1909) § 120. Kelsey v. Jewett, 34 Hun. 11 (5th Dep't,
1884).
3. Herzog. v. Stern, 264 N. Y. 379, 191 N. E. 23 (1934), rev'g 240 App. Div. 881, 267
N. Y. Supp. 968 (1st Dep't, 1933), which reversed 148 Misc. 25, 265 N. Y. Supp. 72 (Sup.
Ct. Special Term, 1933). Contra: Donres v. Storms, 236 App. Div. 630, 260 N. Y. Supp.
335 (4th Dep't, 1932); Kertson v. Johnson, 185 Minn. 591, 242 N. W. 329 (1932); Chub-
buck v. Halloway, 182 Minn. 225, 234 N. W. 314, rev'd on other grounds on reargument,
182 Minn. 231, 234 N. W. 868 (1931).
4. See Lorenzen, Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws (1931) 47 L. Q. REv. 483,
488-489.
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delecti,5 a denial of recovery on facts similar to the instant case could nevertheless
be supported by a number of juridical concepts even though the plaintiff were a resi-
dent of the foreign state. First, by regarding the survival of actions as within the
extremely flexible category of procedural matters,0 that result could be considered the
necessary corollary of the rule that in all matters procedural the law of the forum
governsi By analogy, the cases involving limitations on actions afford competent
authority for this view, for where a question arises as to when a suit may no longer
be brought because of statutory limitation, it is generally said that the question is
one of procedure.8 Here it might be said that the question was similarly one of
limiting the period within which suit could be brought and that consequently the
matter was one of procedure to be governed by the New York law. On the other
hand, assuming that the matter involved were one of substantive law judgment for
the defendant could still be justified on the ground that the survival statute of
Virginia is against the "public policy" of New York,10 which has often been con-
sidered proper justification for refusing to apply the law of a sister state either as a
matter of comity or under the full faith and credit clause." Or the rule that each
sovereign has complete control of the devolution of a decedent's property12 might
be regarded, as in the instant case, as precluding any result but the one reached by
the Court of Appeals.' 3
But the application of any one of these rules would lead to disposal of the case
5. I.e. the law of the place where the injury occurred. Northern Pacific Rr. Co. v.
Babcock, 154 U. S. 190 (1894); Texas and Pacific Ry. Co. v. Humble, 181 U. S. 57 (1931);
Hill v. Chattanooga Ry. and Light Co., 21 Ga. App. 104, 93 S. E. 1027 (1917); Gannett
v. Boston and Maine R., 238 Mass. 125, 130 N. E. 183 (1921); Hasbrouck v. New
York Central and Hartford RP. Co., 202 N. Y. 363, 95 N. E. 803 (1911).
6. This rationalization was used by Surrogate Wingate in denying the plaintiff recovery
under facts similar to the instant case. See In re Killough's Estate, 143 Misc. 73, 37-33S,
265 N. Y. Supp. 301, 319-320 (Surr. Ct. 1933). This interpretation was repudiated, how-
ever, by the Supreme Court in denying recovery under similar facts. See Clough v.
Gardiner, 111 Misc. 244, 182 N. Y. Supp. 803 (Sup. Ct. 1920); cf. Chubbuch v. Halloray,
and Kertson v. Johnson, both supra note 3.
7. See Central Vermont Rr. Co. v. White, 238 U. S. 507, 511 (1915); cf. Chicago
Terminal Transfer R. Co. v. Vandenberg, 164 Ind. 480, 73 N. E. 990 (1905); Sapone v.
New York Central and Hartford Rr. Co., 130 Misc. 755, 225 N. Y. Supp. 211 (Sup. Ct.
1927).
8. Ilinois Power and Light Corp. v. Hurley, 49 F. (2d) 681 (C. C. A. 8th, 19311;
Munos v. Southern Pacific Co. 51 Fed. 188 (C. C. A. 5th, 1892); Backus v. Severn, 127
Misc. 776, 216 N. Y. Supp. 381 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
9. See Clough v. Gardiner, 111 Misc. 244, 182 N. Y. Supp. 803 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
10. This line of reasoning has been used to support decisions ciniar to the one in the
instant case in previous cases arising in the lower New York courts. See Clough v.
Gardiner, 111 Misc. 244, 182 N. Y. Supp. 803 (Sup. Ct. 1920); In re Killough's Estate,
148 Misc. 73, 88, 265 N. Y. Supp. 301, 320 (Surr. Ct. 1933). Contra: Domres v. Storms,
236 App. Div. 630, 260 N. Y. Supp. 335 (4th Dep't, 1932).
11. See Cuba Rr. Co. v. Crosby, 222 U. S. 473, 478 (1912); Stewart v. Baltimore and
Ohio Rr. Co., 168 U. S. 445, 448-449 (1897); Loucks v. Standard Oi Co., 224 N. Y. 99,
106, 120 N. E. 198, 200 (1918).
12. Mager v. Grima, 8 How. 490, 493 (U. S. 1850); See United States v. Perkins, 163
U. S. 625, 629 (1896); State ex rel. McClintock v. Guinotte, 275 Mo. 298, 314, 204 S. W.
806, 808-809 (1918).
13. In re Killough's Estate, 148 Misc. 73, 265 N. Y. Supp. 301 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
160 YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44
on grounds narrower than the real problem involved in the litigation. That problem
is whether a right given by a foreign state to one of its citizens by virtue of certain
operative facts within its jurisdiction, is to be recognized and enforced by the state
of the forum against one of its own citizens. It is true each state is sovereign and
within its borders has a right to set the rules by which its own citizens shall live
and conduct their business. But on the other hand it cannot be overlooked that
modem commercial and social intercourse is largely interstate, which demands that
the utmost respect be given the rights created by each state within its proper jurisdic-
tion in order that cordial and profitable relations can be maintained.14 And only by
a reciprocal recognition and enforcement of rights arising within the jurisdiction of
foreign states, can each state expect to gain the maximum control of matters arising
within its own borders. Moreover, it seems only just that when a citizen of one
state temporarily accepts the protection and advantages of another, the consequences
of his acts within the foreign jurisdiction should be governed by the laws of that
jurisdiction, particularly in so far as residents of the foreign state are concerned. Of
course the right of a person who has suffered a personal injury is not an immediate
right againsi the tortfeasor's property; but, it is a right the fulfillment of which de-
pends directly on the appropriation of a part of his estate. That satisfaction of this
right should depend on the continued life of the testator when the law of the state
where the injury was committed contemplates otherwise is the result of an arbitrary
attention to superficial factors. It is true a state has a right to determine the devolu-
tion of the property of its deceased residents,13 but it is difficult to see that the pres.
ent case is one of devolution. The question is not one of testate or intestate suc-
cession, which devolution would certainly include, but is one of determining whether
or not the plaintiff is such a creditor of the estate as to have rights superior to those
of devolution. His status is more nearly analogous to that of a creditor, so that
property of the deceased that might go to the plaintiff is no part of the estate to
which laws of devolution and succession should have application.
There is, of course, the further possibility that the mandate of the "full faith
and credit" clause of the Federal Constitution requires the New York courts to
recognize the Virginia statute by enforcing the present cause of action. While
originally the clause was construed to apply only to judgments fairly obtained in a
foreign state, 15 recent tendencies are toward applying it to the enforcement of
foreign statutes under which a cause of action is said to have arisen. This ten-
dency has been reflected in cases involving the special fields of insurance contracts o
and workmen's compensation acts, 17 and the language of the clause invites further
extension to include the present case.1 8 The refusal of the Supreme Court to grant
14. For a full development of this argument, see Lorenzen Territoriality, Public Policy
and the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 736.
15. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230 (1908); see Corwin, The "Full Faith and Credit"
Clause (1933) 81 U. ol? PA. L. Rxv. 371, 375.
16. Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U. S. 531 (1915); followed in Modern Woodman
of America v. Mixer, 267 U. S. 544 (1925); Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Dunken, 266
U. S. 389 (1924).
17. Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145 (1932); noted in (1932) 32
COL. L. REv. 131; (1932) 46 HARv. L. Rlv. 291; (1932) 42 YALE L. J. 115.
18. The extension of the "full faith and credit" clause to embrace foreign causes of
action as well as judgments has been previously urged. See Beach, Uniform Interstate
Enforcement of Vested Rights (1918) 27 YALE L. J. 656; Corwin, The "Full Faith and
Credit" Clause (1933) 81 U. oF PA. L. Rrv. 371; Note (1930) 40 YLE L. 3. 291. But
see Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in the Field of
certiorari in this instance'19 may be an indication that it approved of the New York
court's failure to make such an extension. But its refusal may just as well represent
a desire upon the part of the Court to refrain from increasing either its conflict
jurisdiction or its interference with state court discretion.
For some time the more advanced courts have recognized that similarity of legisla-
tion or judicial remedies is not an indispensible condition to the enforcement of for-
eign rights 20 The more modem test is merely whether some fundamental principle of
justice, or some prevalent conception of good morals would be violated; the applica-
tion of such a test would hardly preclude the plaintiff from recovering.
FEEs Or REFEREES iN ComposrrION AGREEMENTS UNDER THE B.AqnurcYz ACT
THE problem in determining the measure of fees for bankruptcy officials under
the federal bankruptcy act is to strike a balance between the need of attracting a
capable personnel, and the ideal of keeping costs low for the protection of creditors.
In the Bankruptcy Act of 1867,1 which awarded onerous fees apparently on the
theory of compensation for work done, Congress erred on the side of leniency to-
wards the supervising officials. The Act of 1898 endeavored to redress the balance
by changing the basis of payment,2 but the effect was excess in the other direction.
Under this act the fees for services rendered were reduced to the point of being
almost purely nominal, and compensation was given upon a commission basis "with
reference to the benefit conferred upon the estate." 3 The commision given referees
in involuntary bankruptcy was one per cent on all sums paid "as dividends and com-
missions." 4 By the same law referees in composition agreements were paid one half
of one per cent "on the amount to be paid creditors upon the confirmation of a com-
position." Payments made under these provisions immediately proved too small to
attract reputable lawyers. Consequently they were soon supplemented by diverse
systems of extra-statutory charges, varying from district to district. Some dis-
tricts developed rules permitting collection of fees for filing and allowing claims,
others granted a per diem charge for hearings, or additional allowances for services
as special master.5 Thus the statutory intention of keeping costs low was lost in
a maze of ingenious but expensive devices for making the position of referee
attractive.
Conflict of Laws (1926) 39 HARv. L. REv. 533 (intimating that the reason the scope of the
"full faith and credit" clause has not been extended to causes of action is because of
certain practical objections).
19. U. S. L. Week, Oct. 9, 1934, at 103, col 3.
20. See Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99, 110-113, 120 N. E. 198, 201 (1913);
Walsh v. New York and New England Rr. Co., 160 Mlass. 571, 36 N. E. 584 (1894);
Hanlon v. Leyland and Co. Ltd., 223 Mass. 438, 442, 111 N. E. 907, 903 (1916).
1. 14 STAT. 517 (1867).
2. 30 STAT. 556 (1898), c. 541, § 40, 11 U. S. C. A. § 68 (1926).
3. In re Meadows, 211 Fed. 943, 950 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914), aff'g 199 Fed. 304 (W. D.
N. Y. 1912). As to the measure of compensation for assignees, cf. Randolph v. Scrugfs,
190 U. S. 533, 538 (1903).
4. 30 STAT. 556, c. 541, § 40 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 68 (1926). It was decided in the
case of In re Utt, 105 Fed. 754 (C. C. A. 7th, 1901) that the dividends on which the com-
mission was based did not include moneys paid to secured creditors. The Amendatory
Act of 1903, 32 STAT. 799, 11 U. S. C. A. § 68 (1926) altered this, so that comm- ons
were paid on amounts disbursed to secured as well as unsecured creditors.
S. See Comtr, Bamua'rc (Gilbert's ed. 1930) 682, n. 5.
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It was for the express purpose of ending these abuses that the Amendatory Act
of 1903 was passed.6 This strictly prohibited any other or further compensation
to referees than that prescribed in the Act,7 enlarged slightly the authorized fees,
and enhanced the commission of referees in involuntary bankruptcy. The commis-
sion in voluntary compositions, however, was left unaltered.
Unfortunately the measure of that commission is ambiguously worded, so that
from the very first the courts have been compelled to construe out of whole cloth
what is "the amount to be paid creditors upon the confirmation of a compositi6n."
There was no difficulty in the ordinary situation where creditors were paid all in
cash through the medium of the court. Where, however, something other than
cash or some substitute for part of the cash was employed, the courts were com-
pelled by their own efforts to seek an equitable balance of compensation. In one
case, for example, bondholders secured by a first mortgage purchased the assets of
the bankrupt at an allowance without actual exchange of money.8 It was held
that the commission should be computed just as if the cash had actually changed
hands. Again where obligations were by stipulation substituted for cash in a com-
position agreement, the commission was not thereby diminished.9 A little later,
where a composition had already been confirmed and a third party agreed to pay
a certain sum of money to a secured creditor for the bankrupt, but not through
the medium of the court, it was held that the commission must be computed on
the whole sum, including that not paid through the court.' 0
Decisions of this nature checked efforts by creditors to lower referees' fees, but
the courts have also been vigilant against efforts of referees to secure more than
they deserved. When a referee ordered and assisted in the sale of pledged assets
although sale by the pledgee without his order would have been rightful and would
have yielded as much, it was held that the referee's commission was not to be based
6. 32 STAT. 799 (1903), 11 U. S. C. A. § 68 (1926).
7. 32 STAT. 800 (1903), 11 U. S. C. A. § 112 (1926).
8. Varney v. Harlow, 210 Fed. 824 (C. C. A. 4th, 1913). The case of American Surety
Co. v. Freed, 224 Fed. 333 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1915) is out of line with this decision, though
not in actual conflict with it. Therein it was held that where creditors purchased the
assets of a bankrupt corporation, encumbered with their own liens, and then cleared the
liens by exchange of preferred stock for bonds and of common stock for the assigned
claims of unsecured creditors, the compensation for the referee was to be measured by
the purchase price of the encumbered assets and not by the value of the recapitalized
company. The court in its desire to limit the referee's fees seems to have overlooked the
important fact that the creditors secured from the bankrupt estate a far greater benefit
than the cash paid for the encumbered property: namely, the value of their liens, what-
ever that might have been. It is a curious case, badly reasoned and obscure. Fortunately
it leads only up a judicial blind alley.
9. In re J. B. White and Co., 225 Fed. 796 (S. D. Ga. 1915). This important decision
is unfortunately so brief that it is obscure both as to facts and reasoning.
10. Matter of Carloss Ice Co., 41 Am. B. R. (N. S.) 306 (1918). The rule was suc-
cinctly stated in the case of In re Sandford Furniture Manufacturing Co., 126 Fed. 888
(E. D. N. C. 1903) as, in effect, that a mere outside agreement between the parties and
their attorneys could not deprive a referee of his rights under the composition agreement,
Probably the leading case on this whole matter, to judge from the number of citations,
is Kinkhead v. Bacon, 230 Fed. 362 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916). This, however, goes no farther
than the other cases, merely stating that the "amount to be paid creditors" was not limited
to the amount paid through the court by deposit of the bankrupt but might include sums
to which certain note holders were entitled by virtue of the composition agreement.
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upon the sum realized by the sale.3 Similarly, where an option was given creditors
of taking twenty-five per cent in cash or one hundred per cent in stock of a new
corporation formed to take over the bankrupt's business, and where the referee in
determining his compensation attempted to take the new stock at par, the court
refused its approval, holding the two offers to be obvious equivalents.'1
Where, however, there is no alternative offer against which to weigh the value
of securities offered in a composition, the problem is more complex. Such was the
case recently presented in a composition agreement reorganizing a New York real
estate investment corporation.' 2  The corporation, with claims against it of $13,-
008,038.30, filed a petition of voluntary bankruptcy. It offered its creditors fifteen
per cent payment in cash, the balance to be paid by a continuance of the old bonds
with certain indorsements. The bonds were to be scaled down to eighty-five per
cent of their former value in consideration of the cash payment, the maturity was
to be extended for periods up to seven years, and there was to be a new interest
rate of five instead of six per cent. More important, interest was to be paid only
out of earnings, if any. The whole scheme of settlement was to lapse in the event
of default. On paper, of course, such a composition is quite attractive. The creditors
lose little more than one per cent of interest and save one hundred per cent of their
principal. If this were so, there would be no injustice in allowing the referee his
full claim of $65,040.10. But in actuality this solution is not so just. The creditors
are receiving at most $1,951,205 in cash, plus some highly dubious bonds, currently
appraised in the open market, not at 85 or over, but at 22.' If the benefit con-
ferred by the referee upon the estate is equitably worth one half of one per cent of
this, and this sum would prove sufficient to attract the services of a capable referee,
the amount claimed is gross overpayment. Very realistically, the court seized upon
the market value of the bond as the test of what was actually saved to the creditors
out of the wreckage, thus setting the commission as one half of one per cent on
37 per cent of the claims, or $24,064.87.14
In the light of previous decisions, it is not strange that the court should so con-
strue the ambiguous terms of the statute. But there are two considerations that
lay such a construction open to attack. The first is that in past cases where the
cash rather than the face value of securities has been taken as the basis for com-
puting the commission, there has been an optional offer in cash,1r' or the substitu-
tion has been for a definite part of a previously arranged cash composition.10 It
does not, however, require a great stretch of the judicial imagination to see in the
opportunity for sale on the market, a kind of cash option for the bonds herein
11. In re AMils Tea and Butter Co., 235 Fed. 815 (D. Alass. 1916). To similar effect
is the case of In re Batterman, 231 Fed. 699 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916), where a composition was
confirmed on the basis of sixty-five per cent in cash, and thereafter certain creditors in
lieu thereof accepted fifteen per cent in cash and eighty-five per cent in notes of another
corporation; the court held that the alternatives were eguivalent. This case, however, was
an instance of a court checking the effort of creditors to diminish a refere's commizrzon.
12. In re Realty Associates Security Corporation, 6 F. Supp. 549 (E. D. N. Y. 1934).
13. Three per cent or slightly over is the current return on so-called gilt-edged bonds.
Thus first class, safe bonds with a face value of 85 and a five per cent return would sAl
considerably above par.
14. Fifteen per cent cash settlement, plus 22, the market value of the bond, is 37-37510
of par.
15. In re Batterman, 231 Fed. 699 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916); In re Mills Tea and Butter
Co., 235 Fed. 815 (D. Mass. 1916).
16. In re J. B. White and Co., 225 Fed. 796 (S. D. Ga. 1915).
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offered creditors. The second is that the Supreme Court, in its latest general order,17
has declared that "for the purpose of computing the commissions of the referee ...
the amount of the debts whose maturity is extended . .. shall be deemed to be
the amount to be paid creditors." It is certainly arguable that by "the amount of
the debts whose maturity is extended" is meant the face value of the obligations.
Whether in making this rule the Supreme Court has fully considered the possibilities
of a case such as the present one, and means the words in that sense, is hard to know.
In the past the lower courts have not construed "amount" appearing in the statute
with any such strictness. In the absence of a more illuminating statement from
the Supreme Court it would appear that the present rule presents no more clear
criterion than the statute and ought to be construed in the same manner. Certainly
the court in the instant case has made a striking adaptation to new circumstances,
and although it is difficult to estimate the chances of reversal upon appeal, the stand
of the lower court must be recognized for its evident courage and wisdom.
EFFECT UPON A MURDERER's ESTATE OF STATUTES PRECLUDING MURDERER'S IN-
HERITANCE FROM VIcrM
A PENNSYLVANIA statute' provides that no person "finally adjudged guilty of
murder" shall inherit from the person killed. After a father had killed his daughter
and then committed suicide before arrest and trial, the orphans' court ordered the
daughter's estate to be distributed to the administrator of her father's estate. To
this decree the next of kin objected on the ground that the statute precluded such
inheritance by a murderer from his victim. But the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
three out of seven justices dissenting, affirmed the lower court's conclusion and
held that the father's estate was not precluded from taking the daughter's estate by
intestate succession as he had not been "adjudged guilty" within the terms of the
statute.
2
The split of judicial opinion in the United States concerning a murderer's right
to inherit from his victim has been the subject of frequent comment,8 and statutes
similar to the one construed in the instant case have been enacted in at least
twenty-three states.4 In the absence of such a statute, some courts have held that
17. General Order XLVIII, § 4, (April 17, 1934).
1. PA. STAT. AiN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 20, § 136.
2. In re Tarlo's Estate, 172 AtI. 139 (Pa. 1934).
3. E.g., I WoERNER, ADmsIrroATON (3d rev. ed. 1923) 186; Ames, Can a Murderer
Acquire Title by his Crime and Keep it? (1897) 36 Am. L. REG. (N. S.) 225, reprinted li
LEcTuREs ox LF:AL HIsToRY (1913) 310; BoRDwv , Statute Law of Wills (1928) 14 IOWA
L. Rxv. 304; Comments (1915) 9.ILL. L. REv. 505; (1908) 7 Micir. L. Rzv. 160; Notes
(1927) 51 A. L. R. 1096; (1931) 71 A. L. R. 288; L. R. A. 1915C 328; (1891) 4 HAv. L.
Rxv. 394; (1894) 8 id. at 170; (1914) 24 id. at 227; (1914) 27 id. at 280; (1917)
30 id. at 622; (1915) 9 ILL. L. REv. 502; (1933) 28 id. at 127; (1906) 4 Mic. L. RIEV.
653; (1908) 7 id. at 71; (1915) 13 id. at 336; (1918) 16 id. at 561; (1931) 29 id. at 745;
(1931) 8 N. Y. U. L. Q. R1v. 492; (1916) 64 U. oF PA. L. REv. 307; (1933) 19 VA. L.
Rxv. 518; (1918) 27 YALE L. J. 964.
4. ARx. Dio. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, Supp. 1927) §§ 3514a, 3514b; CAL. CODE CV.
PRoc. (Deering, 1931) § 258; CoLo. AN. STAT. (Mills, 1930) § 7838a; FLA. Coup. Gr.
LAws ANt. (Supp. 1934) § 5480 (9); IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1926) § 3376; IOwA CODE
(1931) §§ 12032-34; KAN. REv. STAT. ANN. (1923) c. 22, § 133; LA. CIV. CoDE ANt. (Dart.,
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they cannot interfere with the relevant statute of descent 5 and accordingly have
allowed a murderer to inherit. Decisions embodying this view frequently concede
that the result is unfortunate and in West Virginia a court has found a means, in
cases involving the proceeds of a life insurance policy, to avoid the effect of its lip
service to the statute of descent.0 In other jurisdictions the common law maxim 7
that no one may profit by his own wrong has been thought to be sufficiently con-
trolling to justify departure from the laws of descent and to deny inheritance by
the murderer.8 Commentators have insisted that it is more logical to hold that the
legal title passes, but that it is subjected to a constructive trust; this suggestion,
however, has met with scant judicial favor.9 Thus court decisions in ten jurisdic-
1932) § 966; MDNN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 8734; MISS. CODE Azzm. (1930) §§ 1413, 3566;
NEB. Comp. STAT. (1929) c. 30, §§ 119, 120; N. C. CODE Am. (Michie, 1931) §§ 10, 2522,
4099; N. D. Comm. LAWS Am. (1913) § 5633; Oino GE.sz. CODE (Page Supp. 1932) §
10503 (17); OxIA. STAT. Axx. (Harlow 1931) § 1616; ORE. CODE Aim. (1930) c. 10, § 213;
PA. STAT. AwN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 20, §§ 136, 244; S. C. CODE (Michie, 1932) § 8374;
Tmm. AxN. CoDE (Will. Shan. & Harlow, 1932) §§ 8383, 8395; UTAn REV. STAT. Avm.
(1933) tit. 101, c. 3, art. 22; VA. CODE (Michie, 1930) § 5274; W. VA. CODE Ami. (Michie
1932) c. 42, art. 4, § 2; Wyo. Rnv. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1931) c. 88, § 4009. For a
simila statute in the District of Columbia, see D. C. CODE (1929) tit. 25, § 250.
5. Hagan v. Cone, 21 Ga. App. 416, 94 S. E. 602 (1917); Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 265
31. 180, 106 N. E. 785 (1914) ; McAllister v. Fair, 72 Kan. 533, 84 Pac. 112 (1905) ; Eversole
v. Eversole, 169 Ky. 793, 185 S. W. 487 (1916); Golnik v. Mengel, 112 "inn. 349, 123 N.
W. 292 (1910) ; Shellenberger v. Ransom, 41 Neb. 631, 59 N. W. 935 (1894) ; Wilson v. Ran-
dolph, 50 Nev. 371, 261 Pac. 654 (1927); Owens v. Owens, 100 N. C. 240, 6 S. E. 794 (1833);
Deem v. Milliken, 6 Ohio C. C. R. 357, 3 Ohio C. D. 491, aWd without opinion, 53 Ohio
St. 668, 44 N. E. 1134 (1892); De Graffenreid v. Iowa Land and Trust Co., 20 0kla. 637, 95
Pac. 624 (1908); In re Carpenter's Estate, 170 Pa. 203, 32 Atl. 637 (1895); Lucas v.
Harris (Tenn. 1904), unreported, referred to in Beddingfield v. Estill and Newman, 113
Tenn. 39, 50, 100 S. W. 108, 111 (1907); Hill v. Noland, 149 S. W. 288 (Tex. Civ. App.
1912); Johnston v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 85 W. Va. 70, 100 S. E. 865 (1919).
6. Johnston v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 85 W. Va. 70, 1C S. E. 865 (1919)
(insurance company instructed not to pay to victim's administrator because murderer was
sole distributee), followed in Wickline v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co., 106 W. Va.
424, 145 S. E. 743 (1928). For discussion see Note (1920) 18 MicHL L. Rav. 430.
7. BRoom, LGAr. MAnxns (Sth ed. 1911) 233.
8. Price v. Hitaffer, 164 Md. 505, 165 Adl. 470 (1933); Slocum v. Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co, 245 Mass. 565, 139 N. E. 816 (1923); Garwols v. Bankers' Trust Co., 251
Mich. 420, 232 N. W. 239 (1930); Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621, 103 S. W. 641 (1903);
Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 506, 22 N. E. 188 (1889); Smith v. Todd, 155 S. C. 323, 152
S. E. 506 (1930) (statute stating that conviction precludes murderer from inheriting held not
to abrogate common law rule barring all murderers); De Zotell v. Mutual Life Insurance
Co. of N. Y., 60 S. D. 532, 245 N. W. 58 (1932); Box v. Lanier, 112 Tenn. 393, 79 S. W.
1042 (1904); In re Tyler's Estate, 140 Wash. 679, 250 Pac. 456 (1926); In re Willins'
Estate, 192 Wis. 111, 211 N. W. 652 (1927).
9. Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 506, 22 N. E. 188 (1889) held, on the ground of the
common law maxim, that a murderer could not take a devise from his victim and that he
acquired no title. This rule was applied in the first decision of Shellenberger v. Ransom,
31 Neb. 61, 47 N. W. 700 (1891) where its operation was extended to a bona fide purcha-r
from the murderer. In order to prevent such a result commentators then suggerted that
it was preferable to let the murderer take title thus complying with the statute of decent
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tions deny such inheritance as against fourteen states that permit inheritance. In
accordance with this fact, it was said in a recent South Dakota case10 that the
"numerical weight of authority" was that which followed the statute of descent and
allowed the murderer to benefit. But such a statement is misleading. In nine out of
the fourteen states wherein murderers were permitted to take, the legislatures, often
but as a constructive trustee in which case a bona fide purchaser could obtain the prop-
perty free from the trust. Note (1891) 4 HAv. L. Rv. 394; Note (1894) 8 Id. 170; Ames,
Can a Murderer Acquire Title by his Crime and Keep it? (1897) 36 Am. L. Rao. (N. S.)
225. The New York Court of Appeals by a dictum in Ellerson v. Wescott, 148 N. Y. 149,
154, 42 N. E. 540, 542 (1896) supported the constructive trust theory and, while ostensibly
explaining the Riggs decision as in accordance therewith, really overruled the prior cae
on that point. Unfortunately, the mistaken view that the Riggs case adopted the con-
structive trust theory for New York has been perpetuated. See Ciozo, Tur. NAcuRn or
T= JuDirnAL PRocEss (1921) 40-42; Comment (1931) 29 MIcn. L. Rav. 745. The opinion
that the New York courts have made efforts to employ it following the dictum In the
Ellerson case has also been advanced. A Striking Omission in the New York Statute of
Devolution (1930) 1 FiDuciARY L. CnnoN. (No. 11 Dec.) 3-6; (1931) 2 Id. 4-6, 15-17, 32-
36. But the constructive trust theory is not adverted to in any of the subsequent de-
cisions. In re Fleming, 5 App. Div. 190, 39 N. Y. Supp. 156 (1st Dep't, 1896); Logan v.
Whitley, 129 App. Div. 666, 114 N. Y. Supp. 255 (2d Dep't, 1908) ; in re Wolf, 88 Misc. 433,
150 N. Y. Supp. 738 (Surr. Ct. 1914); In re Briggs, 171 App. Div. 52, 156 N. Y. Supp. 947
(3d Dep't, 1916); Van Alstyne v. Tuffy, 103 Misc. 455, 169 N. Y. Supp. 173 (Sup. Ct.
1918) ; In re Santourian's Estate, 125 Misc. 668, 212 N. Y. Supp. 116 (Surr. Ct. 1925).
Other courts in general have disregarded the constructive trust suggestion and have
even, in a few instances, expressly or impliedly disapproved it. See Wall v. Pfanschmldt,
265 fI1. 180, 192, 106 N. E. 785, 789 (1914); In re Kuhn's Estate, 125 Iowa 449, 451, 101
N. W. 151, 152 (1904); Wellner v. Eckstein (opinion of Start, C. J.) 105 Miann. 444, 449,
117 N. W. 830, 834 (1908); Holloway v. McCormick, 41 Okla. 1, 5, 136 Pac. 1111, 1112
(1913). The only judicial decisions in support of the ,theory are those where a con-
structive trust was imposed on a tenant by the entirety in favor of the heirs of his
spouse whom he had feloniously killed. Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N. C. 372, 137 S. E. 188
(1927); Barnett v. Couey, 224 Mo. App. 913, 27 S. W. (2d) 757 (1930). Contra: Bedding-
field v. Estill and Newman, 118 Tenn. 39, 100 S. W. 108 (1907).
In his article advocating the theory, Dean Ames maintained that equity should compel
the murderer to hold the property as a constructive trustee for the person wronged, "or,
if he be dead, for his representative." Many commentators have approved of this sug.
gestion. CARnozo, TuE NA=uRE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921) 42; Note (1917) 30
HAv. L. Rav. 622; Note (1918) 16 MIcH. L. REv. 561; Comment (1931) 29 Id. 745; Note
(1916) 64 U. oF PA. L. Rav. 307; Note (1918) 27 YALE L. J. 964. But adverse comment
has not been lacking. Note (1911) 24 H.nv. L. REv. 227; Note (1914) 27 Id. at 280; Com-
ment, (1915) 9 Ir.. L. Ray. 505; Note (1931) 8 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 492. A serious criti-
cism is that the application of this rule permits the other heirs of the victim, exclusive of the
murderer, to inherit. They, however, were not intended by any one to take an Interest
in the victim's estate and cannot be considered as having been wronged by the murderer's
act, except in so far as it deprived them of the chance that the deceased, had he lived,
would have made a will in their favor or survived the slayer. It is rather the murderer's
own heirs who would be wronged by their ancestor's crime if the constuctive trust were
used for the end suggested by Dean Ames; it should more properly be employed as a
device whereby the criminal would be decreed as holding for them.
10. See De Zotell v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York, 60 S. D. 532, 538, 245
N. W. 58, 61 (1932).
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very promptly, responded to judicial suggestion by enacting new laws or by
modifying existing ones' to prevent in greater or less degree 2 recurrence of the
result. And since 1922, seven of the eight states to pass upon the question for
the first time have applied the common law rule and prohibited the murderer from
taking.' 3 Accordingly, in only five of the twenty-four jurisdictions discussed would
a murderer now be able to inherit from his victim.
The question in the present case is not, however, the same as the question upon
which the general legislative policy has been based. In the previous cases which
led to legislation on the subject the issue has usually been raised where the
murderer or his attorney would directly have benefited by inheritance. In six cases
the claim was presented by counsel who had defended the murder and who held an
assignment of the the inheritance,' 4 while in three the estate was awarded to
widows sentenced to imprisonment for killing their husbands.'0 In the other four-
teen states which have enacted such legislation there is some evidence that it may
have come to pass as the result of unreported cases10 or as a consequence of murder
11. In re Kuhn's Estate, 125 Iowa 449, 101 N. W. 151 (1904) (statute amended 1902,
while case still pending on appeal, to bring surviving spouse within its terms); McAllster
v. Fair, 72 Kan. 533, 84 Pac. 112 (1906) (statute passed 1907); GoUnik v. Mengel, 112
Alinn. 349, 128 N. W. 292 (1910) (statute pased 1917); Shellenberger v. Ransom, 41 Neb.
631, 59 N. W. 935 (1894) (statute passed 1913); Owens v. Owens, 100 N. C. 240, 6 S. E.
794 (1888) (statute amended 1889 to include dower, curtesy, year's provision and di-
tributive share of surviving spouse); National Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. Davis, 38 Ohio
App. 454, 176 N. E. 490 (1929) (statute passed 1931); Equitable Life Assurance Co. v.
Weightenan, 61 Okla. 106, 160 Pac. 629 (1916) (statute p3ed 1915 while case still
pending on appeal); In re Carpenter's Estate, 170 Pa. 203, 32 At. 637 (IS95) [statute
passed 1917 expressly to meet situation presented by Carpenter case; see In re Tarlo's
Estate, 172 At. 139, 141 (Pa. 1934)]. In Tennessee the common law rule was accepted in
Box v. Lanier, 112 Tenn. 393, 79 S. W. 1042 (1904) and the statute, pased in 1905, may
have been enacted as a result of the unreported case of Lucas v. Harris (Tenn. 1904)(tenancy by entireties), which is mentioned in Beddingfield v. Estill and Newman, 118
Tenn. 39, 50, 100 S. W. 103, 111 (1907).
12. For discussions of the varied phrasing of such statutes and its effect see Bord-
well, Statute Law of Wills (1928) 14 IowA L. Rxv. 304; Note (1931) 29 Micar. L. Rav.
745, 749; Note (1931) 8 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rav. 492. For a suggestion of the various prob-
lems to be considered in drawing up such a statute see A Striking Omission in the ,ew
York Statute of Devolution (1931) 2 FmucrARy L. Cironm. 35-36.
13. Price v. Hitaffer, 164 Md. 505, 165 At. 470 (1933); Slocum v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 245 Mass. 565, 139 N. E. 816 (1923) ; Garwols v. Bankers' Trust Co, 251 Mich.
420, 232 N. W. 239 (1930) ; Smith v. Todd, 155 S. C. 323, 152 S. E. 506 (1930) ; Do Zotel
v. Mfutual Life Insurance Co. of N. Y., 60 S. D. 532, 245 N. W. 58 (1932); In re Tyler's
Estate, 140 Wash. 679, 250 Pac. 456 (1926); In re Wilkins' Estate, 192 Wis. 111, 211 N. W.
652 (1927). The exception is Vilson v. Randolph, 50 Nev. 371, 261 Pac. 654 (1927).
14. McAllister v. Fair, 72 Kan. 533, 84 Pac. 112 (1906); Shellenberger v. Ransom, 41
Neb. 631, 59 N. W. 935 (1894); Deem v. flliken, 6 Ohio C. C. R; 357, 3 Ohio C. D. 491,
aff'd without opinion, 53 Ohio St. 668, 44 N. E. 1134 (1892); De Graffenreid v. Iowa
Land and Trust Co., 20 OkIa. 687, 95 Pac. 624 (1908); In re Carpenter's Estate, 170 Pa.
203, 32 At. 637 (1895); Johnston v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 85 W. Va. 70, 100
S. E. 865 (1919).
15. Golnik v. Mengel, 112 Minn. 349, 128 N. W. 292 (1910); Owens v. O ens, 102 N.
C. 240, 6 S. E. 794 (1888); National Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. Davis, 38 Ohio App.
454, 176 N. E. 490 (1929).
16. See remarks concerning Lucas v. Harris (Tenn. 1904), supra note 11.
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trials wherein the matter of inheritance was not an issue but where public indigna-
tion was aroused by the fact that the victim's estate was being used to compensate
the murderer's counsel. 17 But here the question is whether, the murderer having
precluded himself by suicide from benefiting, there is any requirement of visiting his
sins upon his presumably innocent successors.18
Had the deaths of the two persons involved in the instant case occurred in like
sequence but as the result of an accident, unquestionably the father's administrator
would have been awarded the daughter's estate. It may be argued that there is no
sufficient reason why the father's creditors, devisees, or heirs should go empty-handed
merely because the deaths resulted from a criminal action over which they had no
control. 10 Public policy has favored abolishing forfeiture of property for crime; -"
and under the constitutional provisions which do permit it, merely an estate for the
life of the criminal may be forfeited, as it was thought that no additional penalty
should be imposed upon the wrongdoer's family.21 Similar considerations seem
applicable to any other class of innocent persons claiming under a criminal. On the
other hand a doctrine permitting the estate of a self-destroyed murderer to take may
be thought contrary to public policy. Cases of suicide by one in desperate circum-
stances who has insured his own life with the object of thus providing for his
family or of making good defalcations committed while in a position of trust are
by no means unknown. It is conceivable that a person in such straits and actuated
17. See Thomas, Public Policy as Affecting Property Rights as a Result of Wrongful
Acts (1908) 1 CA ir. L. REv. 299, 407, stating that the California statute passed in 1905
was due to such circumstances appearing in a criminal prosecution, People v. Weber, 149
Cal. 325, 86 Pac. 671, finally decided in 1906.
18. In several previous cases involving situations where the murderer had committed
suicide the courts failed to discuss what seems to be the real question at Issue: Price v.
Hitaffer, 164 Md. 505, 165 AtI. 470 (1933); Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621, 108 S.
W. 641 (1908); Holloway v. McCormick, 41 Okla. 1, 136 Pac. 1111 (1913); Wickline v.
Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co., 106 W. Va. 424, 145 S. E. 743 (1928); In re Wilkins'
Estate, 192 Wis. 111, 211 N. W. 652 (1927). The rights of the innocent heirs are con-
sidered only in the dissenting opinion in Box v. Lanier, 112 Tenn. 393, 79 S. W. 1042
(1904). In Van Alstyne v. Tuffy, 103 Misc. 455, 169 N. Y. Supp. 173 (1918) the problem
is briefly dismissed as not a ground for distinction.
19. It may be said that heirs who would have benefited suffer just as much and just as
innocently if their ancestor is convicted and sentenced. But in such a case It s so
abhorrent to permit the murderer to employ the proceeds of his unjust enrichment for
counsel fees or appeals, that the lesser inequity must prevail.
20. 1 STAT. 117 (1790), 18 U. S. C. A. § 544 (1927); ILL. CoNsT. art II, § 11; ID.
CoNsT. art. 1, § 82; MIN. CoNsr. art. I, § 11; Mo. CONST. art. II, § 13; Ouixo CONST. art,
I, § 12; Wis. CONST. art. I, § 12.
21. U. S. CONST. Art. III, § 3; KY. CoNsr. § 20; PA. CoNsT. art. I, § 19; 1 PAOE, WILLS
(2d ed. 1926) 214. The courts which have applied the common law maxim and precluded
a murderer from taking by descent or devise have maintained that no forfeiture was im-
posed because the murderer had never inherited and, therefore, was not deprived of an
estate to which he had title. Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621, 108 S. W. 641 (1908);
Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 506, 22 N. E. 188 (1889); Box v. Lanier, 112 Tenn. 393, 79
S. W. 1042 (1904) ; In re Tyler's Estate, 140 Wash. 679, 250 Pac. 456 (1926) ; see WUARTON,
HomcmE (3d ed. 1907) § 665. This subtle distinction between taking away an estate and
the expectancy thereof is unfortunate because forfeitures were abolished for the benefit of
children and heirs. Wallach v. Van Riswick, 92 U. S. 202 (1875); ROOD, WnILS (2d ed.
1926) § 143.
by like motives might plan a suicide preceded by the murder of some wealthy rela-
tive or friend from whom an inheritance or a bequest is expected. But such a pre-
meditated double killing would probably occur infrequently. Nevertheless the pos-
sibility does exist and cases have come up where there appeared to be such intent,
as where a murderer bequeathed the proceeds of his victim's life insurance policy
during the period intervening between the murder and his own suicide.P Yet to
eliminate succession only in such a case on the ground of the public policy against
offering inducements to commit crime would require a determination of intent, which
is impractical because of the difficulty of proving the presence or lack thereof.P
Therefore, if it is thought essential on public policy grounds to preclude succession
in cases where the intent to acquire property motivated the crime, it will be neces-
sary to bar the murderer's estate from taking in every instance.2 4 The alternative
will be to permit succession in every case. It is difficult to choose between these
two policies, and therefore hard to criticize adversely the result reached in the
instant case where the Pennsylvania court by giving the statute a strict construction
permitted the estate of this murderer, who had committed suicide before he could be
brought to trial and convicted, to take.25 This is particularly true as there is little in-
formation to determine whether, at the time the statute was passed, the legislature
considered the further question of the rights of other parties should the murderer
also be dead.
However, some statutes do not require "conviction," but are so broadly phrased as
to preclude a murderer from succeeding to his victim's property under any circum-
stances. Under such a statute the result of permitting his estate to take could only be
achieved if the court were willing to read into the law an intent to prohibit "en-
joyment" by the murderer rather than succession, or if it were willing to adopt a
constructive trust theory to attain the same result. No court, as far as is known, has
ever attempted such judicial legislation. And such conduct on the part of a court,
particularly in view of the misgivings attached to pursuing a policy which might
offer a possible inducement to crime, would be justifiable only if there were a strong
contrary public policy demanding it. And even though it may be desirable that
22. Such a situation did occur in Wickline v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co., 105
W. Va. 424, 145 S. E. 743 (1928), where a wife murdered her husband, on the next day be-
queathed the proceeds of his life insurance to her sister, and on the day after that com-
mitted suicide.
23. It is significant that only one of the many statutes which prohibit a murderer from
inheriting require that the crimes shall have been committed in order to obtain the victim'S
property. 7A. CODE (Mlichie, 1930) § 5274. Two decisions make intent the criterion.
Gollnik v. Mengel, 112 Minn. 349, 128 N. W. 292 (1910) (-econd degree murder); In re
Wolf, 88 Misc. 433, 150 N. Y. Supp. 738 (Surr. Ct. 1914) (aggrieved husband accidentally
killed wife instead of her paramour). But the latter decision was exprcly overruled on
the point of intent by Van Alstyne v. Tuffy, 103 Misc. 455, 169 N. Y. Supp. 173 (Sup. Ct.
1918). And in cases where intent was lacking, courts have stated that a murderer would
inherit under the relevant statute of descent even had such intent been prezent. Do
Graffenreid v. Iowa Land and Trust Co., 20 Okla. 687, 95 Pac. 624 (1903); Holloway v.
McCormick, 41 Okla. 1, 136 Pac. 1111 (1913).
24. Under a statute stipulating that conviction shall preclude a murderer from taking,
such a result may be obtained by construing it not as a delimitation of, but as merely
supplementary to the common law maxim barring murderers under all circumstances.
Smith v. Todd, 155 S. C. 323, 152 S. E. 506 (1930).
25. Hogg v. Witham, 120 Kan. 341, 242 Pac. 1021 (1926) reached a like result under
sinilar circumstances.
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innocent persons should be protected, it must be remembered that devolution of prop-
erty is largely fortuitous and that it is always difficult to summon a convincing argu-
ment to overthrow the clear words of a statute. In such an instance it might
similarly be well for courts to follow the legislative statement and thus to place upon
the legislatures the need either to express more clearly what is intended to be ac-
complished or to accept the responsibility for curious results.
RIGHT TO SET OFF PARTNER'S DEPOSITS IN INDIVIDUAL AND FIDUCIARY CAPACITIES
AGAINST DEBT OWED BY PARTNERSHIP TO INSOLVENT BANK
A STATE banking commissioner, in control of an insolvent bank for the purpose of
liquidation, sought payment of matured partnership notes. The defendant partners
claimed set-offs for the personal deposit of one of the partners who had since deceased,
for the account of another partner as decedent's administrator, and for the sum de-
posited by the same partner as guardian of the dead man's children and heirs. The
court allowed the set-offs as to all of these deposits on the basis of the equities of the
situation and the possible prevention of circuity of action.1
Originally a product of early equity courts, set-off is now a statutory right in actions
between solvents.2 Limiting its application, however, is the commonly accepted doc-
trine of mutuality which allows set-offs only of those claims due to and from the
same parties in the same right and capacity. This principle also has long been gen-
erally applied in suits between insolvent banks and their depositors 4 and particularly
to deny in such suits the set-off of the personal deposit of one partner against a loan
granted him in his joint capacity.r The fact that a partner is severally as well as
1. Bryant Bros. v. Wilson, 253 Ky. 578, 69 S. W. (2d) 1020 (1934).
2. See Lloyd, Development of Set-Off (1916) 64 U. OF PA. L. REV. 541.
3. The reason given for this rule is the "obvious injustice" of cancelling a debt due one
against his obligation to a third person; or of setting off a credit gained in one capacity
against a debt owed in a different role. WATsMAN, SEr-OFF (2d ed. 1872) § 164; (1932)
80 U. OF PA. L. REV. 420, 426. When the question of set-off arises in bankruptcy adminis-
tration, the basis of its application depends more upon the tenets of equity procedure than
statutory allowance. Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U. S. 499 (1892).
4. Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U. S. 499 (1892); Thomas v. Potter Title and Trust Co.,
2 F. Supp. 12 (W. D. Pa. 1932); Raymond v. Palmer, 41 La. Ann. 425, 6 So. 692
(1889); Lewis v. Pickering 58 Neb. 63, 78 N. W. 368 (1899); Coburn v. Carstarphen, 194
N. C. 368, 139 S. E. 596 (1927); Miller v. Receivers of Franklin Bank, 1 Paige 444 (N. Y.
1829); 5 MIcum, BANKs AND BANKING (1932) §§ 152, 155, 157c; WATERMAN, SEr-Orr §
148, 174.
5. Brashears v. Johnson, 106 Miss. 739, 64 So. 722 (1914) ; In re Alien, 37 Barb. 225 (N.
Y. 1861); Bowling Green Savings Bank v. Todd, 64 Barb. 146 (N. Y. 1872); Bank of
Anderson v. Alien et al., 146 S. C. 107, 143 S. E. 646 (1928); MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP (2d ed.
1920) §§ 340, 341; 1 MORSE, BANKs AND BANKING (6th ed. 1928) § 326 ("Neither can the
individual partner and the firm so shift their respective credits and debts as to set them
off, the one against the other, when the bank itself is insolvent."); (1934) 47 HARv. L. R.
1069. Contra: Owsley v. Bank of Cumberland, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1726, 66 S. W. 33 (1902);
Eyrich v. Capital State Bank, 67 Miss. 60, 6 So. 615 (1899); Jack v. Klepser et al., 196
Pa. St. 187, 46 AtI. 479 (1900). The same principle applies in cases not involving insolvent
banks. Gregg v. James and Philips, 1 Ill. 143 (1825); Executors of Browne v. Thompon
and Brackenridge, 1 N. J. L. 2 (1790); Hunter v. Booth et al., 84 App. Div. 85, 82 N. Y.
Supp. 1000 (2d Dep't. 1903); Thomas v. Noonan et al., 133 App. Div. 459, 118 N. Y. Supp,
jointly liable for his firm's debtsO does not make the distinction betveen the two
capacities so tenuous as to permit set-off;7 the operative consequences of the differ-
entiation of individual and partnership capacities in other legal situations substantiate
the tangibility of the formal discrimination. Thus where the partnership is solvent,
the analogy of a surety has been applied requiring the firm to pay from its assets
before its individual members are levied upon.8 And where the problem of distri-
bution to creditors of the assets of bankrupt partners and their insolvent firms has
arisen, the impact of the Federal Bankruptcy Act and the Uniform Partnership
Law'10 has required distribution of partnership property to holders of claims against
the firm, and individual assets to personal creditors of the members. The diversion of
one source of payment to the other channel is permitted only when all claims against
the initial sources have been satisfied. Recognition of the distinction of capacities in
the principal case, therefore, would operate to bar the set-off of the decedent's indi-
vidual account against the debt of his firm for lack of mutuality. In those jurisdic-
tions where the fiduciary has the status of an ordinary individual depositor,1 1 the
set-off of funds held in administrative and guardianship capacities, as in the case of
the second partner, is similarly obviated by the mutuality doctrine, for the application
25 (3d Dep't. 1909); Blumenthal v. Katz et al., 74 Misc. 456, 132 N. Y. Supp. 314 (1911);
Pophan v. Rubin et al., 134 N. Y. Supp. 1067 (1912). Contra: McAllister v. Alillhiser, 96 Ga.
474, 23 S. E. 502 (1895) ; Jeffries v. Evans et al., 45 Ky. 119, 43 Am. Dec. 158 (1845).
6. Acnrzr, PAaNmLm, §§ 313, 314.
7. Briggs v. Briggs and Vose, 20 Barb. 477 (N. Y. 1855); Youmans et al. v. Moore, 11
Ga. App. 66, 74 S. E. 710 (1912) semble. These decisions are based on the concept that
the debt of the firm is the debt of each of the partners. But see Hodgin v. People's National
Bank, 124 N. C. 540, 32 S. E. 887 (1899); 2 BoLLEs, B, N G (1907) 745, 746 (". . the
deposit of an individual partner cannot be applied to the partnership debt, notwithstand-
ing the universal rule that each partner is severally responsible for the indebtednes3 of the
concern.')
8. Edmonson v. Thomasson, 112 Va. 326, 71 S. E. 536 (1911). For discuszion of the
effect of the mutuality doctrine on set-off by sureties see Comment (1932) 41 YAux L. 3. 831.
9. 30 STAT. 547 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 23(f) (1926) (Bankruptcy Act) provides "...
the net proceeds of the partnership property shall be appropriated to the payment of the
partnership debts, and the net proceeds of the individual estate of each partner to the
payment of his individual debts." Section 23(d) further requires separate accounting of
partnership and individual property. In re Denning, 114 Fed. 219 (D. C. M 9a. 102);
Titus v. Maxwell, 281 Fed. 433 (C. C. A. 6th, 1922); Paggi v. Rose Manufacturing Co. 235
S. W. 852 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
10. Ur-oaax PRNimsnsP LAW § 40(i), dealing with the payment to creditors by an
insolvent partner, specifies prior payment of those debts owed to separate creditors over
those due the partnership creditors. When a partner is deceased, although his property may
be applied to the obligations of the partnership, it is subject to prior levy by his individual
creditors. Id. § 36 (4).
11. Two considerations prompt the finding that the trustee is an individual depositor.
Since he is personally responsible to the cestuis for the funds, the latter are not deprived4
of a remedy against him in the event of misappropriation. Funk and Son v. Young, 13S
Ark. 38, 210 S. W. 143 (1919); Laubach v. Liebert, 87 Pa. St. 55 (1373). The stipula-
tions, "guardian," "executor," or "treasurer" are mere descriptio personae, not altering the
account's individual ownership. Forrester v. Cantley, 51 S. W. (2d) 550 (Mo. 1932); Miller
v. Receivers of Franklin Bank, 1 Paige 444 (N. Y. 1829); Comfort v. Patterson, 70 Tenn.
670 (1879). For a general discussion of the right of set-off of funds held in fiduciary ca-
pacity see (1933) 31 Mac. L. Rxv. 844.
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of these funds by the trustee in his individual capacity to partnership debts would
be using the deposit of one member to off-set the liabilities of the firm to the bank.
And a fortiori, if the fiduciary is considered a depositor solely in the capacity of a
trustee,12 he cannot subject these accounts to the payment of debts incurred by the
firm. To reach the result in the principal case the court therefore rejected the
normally accepted criterion of mutuality.
But it does not seem that the case marks an advance in the development of equitable
set-off which, independently of statute, avoids the rigidities of the rule requiring
mutuality. Such liberality has featured a long line of cases granting equitable relief
because of the insolvency of one of the parties in order to escape the unfair result
of payment on one side by the solvent obligor with no return from the delinquent.la
But it is evident that insolvency alone did not motivate these findings as much as did
the peculiar circumstances of each individual case.14 In the instant situation, bal-
ancing of the apparent equities would scarcely seem to favor disregarding the strict
mutuality doctrine. Assuming that the children15 would be entitled to reimbursement
in full from the trustee or from the firm for the funds appropriated to the latters
use'0 allowance of the set-off would give them a preference over the other depositors
12. Many decisions so hold on the reasoning that there is no mutuality in the capacities
of the trustee-depositor and the individual debtor. Thomas v. Potter Title and Trust Co,,
2 Supp. 12 (W. D. Pa. 1932); Cosmopolitan Trust Co. v. Wasserman, 251 Mass, 514,
146 N. E. 772 (1925); Lawrence v. Lincoln County Trust Co., 123 Me. 273, 122 AtI. 765
(1923); Lewis v. Pickering, 58 Neb. 63, 78 N. W. 368 (1899); Gallagher v. David Stevenson
Brewing Co., 13 Misc. 40, 34 N. Y. Supp. 594 (1895); Rubel v. Hunt, 40 Ohio App.
561, 179 N. E. 367 (1931); Tobey v. Manufacturers National Bank, 9 R. I. 236 (1869);
Wagner v. Citizen's Bank and Trust Co., 122 Tenn. 164, 122 S. W. 245 (1909); cf. Wasson
v. Gould, 3 Blackf. 18 (Ind. 1832) (off-set agairlst plaintiff suing as executrix of debt
owed by her individually to defendant refused); Robertson v. Garshwiller, 81 Ind. 463(1882) (note executed in guardianship capacity could not be set off against debt owed
guardian personally). Other cases reason that it is inequitable to allow a fiduciary to
appropriate the funds of the beneficiary to his own use. People v. German Bank, 16 App.
Div. 687, 101 N. Y. Supp. 917 (4th Dep't. 1906), aff'd, 192 N. Y. 533, 84 N. E. 1117 (1908);
Sanford v. Pike, 87 Ore. 614, 170 Pac. 729 (1918) ; Dobyns and Davis v. Rawley, 76 Va. 537,
542 (1882) ("The court will not allow much less aid, a guardian to apply the estate of his
wards to the discharge of his individual indebtedness.")
13. Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U. S. 499 (1892); Lindsay v. Jackson, 2 Paige 581 (N. Y.
Ch. 1837); Holbrook v. Receivers of American Fire Insurance Co., 6 Paige 220 (N. Y.
Ch. 1836); Wyckoff v. Williams, 135 App. Div. 495, 121 N. Y. Supp. 181 (1st Dep't. 1910).
14. North Chicago Rolling Mill Co. v. St. Louis Ore and Steel Co., 152 U. S. 596 (1894)
(garnishee allowed set-off despite immaturity of his claim because of non-residence In
addition to insolvency); Colton v. Dover Perpetual Building and Loan Association of
Baltimore, 90 Md. 85, 45 Atl. 23 (1899) (refusal to allow set-off of deposit made expressly
to repay loan held unjust); Moore v. Greeneville Banking and Trust Co. et al., 173 N. C.
180, 91 S. E. 793 (1917) (a fraudulent conveyance was discovered in addition to insolvency);
Hughitt v. Hayes, 136 N. Y. 163, 32 N. E. 706 (1892) (the off-set sought was specific per-
formance of a contract for the sale of land after defendant-purchaser had made valuable
improvements in reliance on expected conveyance); WATrANg , SET-Orr §§ 431, 432.
15. Since the children were the only legatees the money in the decedent's personal account
and the money in the administrator's account as well as that in the guardian's account
would inure to them.
16. Aside from loose equitable rationalization which would prevent the trustee's and
the partnership's deriving sole benefit from the set off there are two theories upon which
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and creditors of the bank. If, on the other hand, the children's reimbursement should
be considered as limited to the amount of dividends they would have received as
general depositors of the insolvent bank,17 to allow the set-offs would present the
partnership with a gift of the difference between the amount declarable as dividends
and the face value of the deposits. In addition it would deplete by the entire
amount of the set-offs the fund available for distribution among depositors and
creditors. To allow the set-off would, moreover, subject the children to the risk of
further loss in the event that the trustee and the firm should become insolvent and
pay lower dividends than the bank. Nor can there be prevention of circuity of
action in granting the set-off as to the administrator-guardian since he has no right
to claim for any more than the bank dividends which are paid out by the state banIzng
commissioner.' 8 Since it is commonly accepted that in order to claim equitable
set-off the substantial justice in its favor must be superior to the equitable arguments
in opposition' 9 it would seem that even on 'equitable grounds the instant decision is
questionable.
ENFORCEENT oF ORAL PROISE TO RETURN PERSONALTY T=NsFEnRP. WiTH
INTENT TO DEFRAUD
PLAINTIFF, under indictment for criminal assault and in fear of an additional dvil
suit, transferred his bank account and other personalty to his niece, she promising
orally to return it upon request. The second suit having failed to materialize, the
plaintiff demanded return of the property transferred but the transferee refused.
In an action for breach of the contract agreement, the court awarded the plaintiff
damages on the ground that the transferee should not be allowed to avail her-elf
of the attempted fraud in which she had participated for the purpose of avoiding
the obligation of the contract.'
It is well established that existing creditors may set aside a conveyance made for
full reimbursement can be based. If the account be considered as the trustee's individual
deposit (see cases cited note 11, supra) he appropriated it when the deposit was made and
hence is responsible to the cestuis for the full amount. Or the appropriation may be con-
sidered an unsecured loan of the cestuis' funds to the partnership which is a breach of
trust and renders the fiduciary liable and the partnership responsible as truastees in invitum
since they knew of the nature of the deposit. Cf. Leach v. Gray et al., 201 Ala. 47, 77 So.
341 (1917).
17. It might be argued that the deposits, which really belong to the children (sze cases
cited note 12, supra), were not appropriated until, after the state bank commissioner too!,
control of the insolvent bank, the set-offs were asserted. The value of the deposits so appro-
priated was the dividend, 20 per cent of the original amount. And since this was all
the children lost by the appropriation, it was all they were entitled to in reimbursement.
18. If the deposit is considered as an individual account (see note 11, supra), th2
fiduciary standing in the same position as any other depositor will come under the distri-
bution to general depositors; even if considered a trust fund, the account is not in the
category of a special preferred fund. People v. Home State Bank, 333 Ill. 179, 170 N. E.
205 (1930); Denny v. Thompson, 236 Ky. 714, 33 S. W. (2d) 670 (1930); Pethybridge v.
Frost State Bank, 75 Mont. 173, 243 Pac. 569 (1926); 5 MrIC13., B,% ,,s .
§ 330. Hence he receives no preference or priority in payment.
19. WATERaTAv, SET-OFF § 439.
1. Gallo v. De Michael, 118 Conn. 487, 172 Aft. 922 (1934).
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the purpose of hindering or defrauding creditors.2 But the defrauding transferor may
not ordinarily have such a conveyance set aside; 3 the court, by way of punishment
for the attempted fraud, will refuse to grant relief to a party who, in technical
language, has unclean hands4 or is in part delicto.5 Such is frequently the result
where the equitable remedies of specific performance of a promise by the transferee
to reconvey6 or oral and resulting trusts7 are claimed by the transferor. Thus,
although the conveyance is itself not fraudulent as to the parties thereto, equity
refuses to lend its aid to relieve a party from the consequences of his own fraud.8
In the principal case, however, the plaintiff did not seek an equitable remedy to
nullify the transfer but sought to enforce a secondary right arising from the transfer
contract by claiming damages for its breach.0 Since the facts of the case do not
bring it within any of the usual exceptions which allow recovery where the trans-
feree has been more at fault, viz. by false inducement,10 advantage taken of a
fiduciary position,11 and undue influence exerted over one of weak mental capacity,'2
the attempt was made to take the case to the law side of the docket in order to
2. 13 Erzz., c. 5 represents the common law rule followed in case law and statutory pro-
visions in all the states except the sixteen which have adopted the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act. See (1934) 43 Y= L. J. 1341, n. 15. For the text of 13 ELZ., c. 5,
see GL2Nx FRAUDULENT CoNVEYANcE (1931) 587.
3. Dent v. Ferguson, 132 U. S. 50 (1889) ; Baird v. Howison, 154 Ala. 359, 45 So. 668
(1907); Gest v. Gest, 117 Conn. 289, 167 Atl. 909 (1934); Castellow v. Brown, 119 Ga,
461, 46 S. E. 632 (1904); Rosenbaum v. Huebner, 277 II. 360, 115 N. E. 558 (1917);
Reed v. Robbins, 58 Ind. App. 659, 108 N. E. 780 (1915); Carson v. Beliles, 121 Ky. 294,
89 S. W. 208 (1905); Massi v. Lavine, 139 Mich. 140, 102 N. W. '665 (1905); Tantum v.
Miller, 11 N. J. Eq. 551 (1858); White v. Cuthbert, 41 N. Y. S. 818 (1896).
4. Gest v. Gest, 117 Conn. 289, 167 Atl. 909 (1934); Rosenbaum v. Huebner, 277 111,
360, 115 N. E. 558 (1917); Massi v. Lavine, 139 Mich. 140, 102 N. V. 665 (1905).
5. Dent v. Ferguson, 132 U. S. 50 (1889); Baird v. Howison, 154 Ala. 359, 45 So. 668
(1908).
6. Vollaro v. Gargano, 97 Conn. 275, 116 Atl. 179 (1922); Hoff v. Hoff, 106 Kan. 542,
189 Pac. 613 (1920); White v. Cuthbert, 41 N. Y. Supp. 818 (1896).
7. Higginbotham v. Boggs, 234 Fed. 253 (C. C. A. 4th, 1916); Caines v. Sawyer, 248
Mass. 368, 143 N. E.'326 (1924); Lieb v. Griffin, 147 Atl. 634 (N. J. 1929), noted in
(1930) 39 YALE L. J. 758; Scarborough v. Blount, 154 S. W. 312 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913);
Note (1931) 44 HARv. L. REv. 1143. In conveyances of realty made with an oral
promise to reconvey, the Statute of Frauds raises an additional barrier of proof not found
in transfers of personalty and necessitates the use of the resulting trust presumption.
Randall v. Howard, 67 U. S. 585 (1862).
8. Bux, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANcES (3d. ed. 1882) 443; 1 Pommoy, EQuiTY Juns-
PRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) § 401; 2 id. §§ 940, 941. See also cases cited notes 4 and 5,
supra.
9. Cf. Lufkin v. Jakeman, 188 Mass. 528, 74 N. E. 933 (1905) (held that since a
fraudulent conveyance is good between parties to the conveyance the transferor could en-
force against the transferee the resulting trust attaching to a gratuitous conveyance).
10. Prewett v. Coopwood, 30 Miss. 369 (1885); Holliway v. Holliway, 77 Mo. 392
(1883); Kleeman v. Peltzer, 17 Neb. 381, 22 N. W. 793 (1885); 2 Poxmoy, op. cit. s11pra
note 8, § 942; cf. WooDwARD, QuAsI-CONTrAcrs (1913) § 142.
11. Anderson v. Nelson, 83 Cal. App 1, 256 Pac. 294 (1927); Brant v. Brant, 115 Iowa
701, 87 N. W. 406 (1901); Harper v. Harper, 85 Ky. 160, 3 S. W. 5 (1887).
12. Anderson v. Nelson, 83 Cal. App. 1, 256 Pac. 294 (1927); Holliway v. Holliway,
77 Mo. 392 (1883).
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avoid the equitable barrier. This, however, would be unavailing since the same result
is achieved in law as in equity by declaring the transaction to be based on an illegal
contract' 3 or by the interposition of the equitable defense in a code court.14 The
plaintiff would gain little by the attempt to keep to the law side except perhaps to
force the defendant to plead the fraud specially' 5 or to remove to the equity side.
Where there were no creditors actually defrauded, the courts have generally allowed
the transferor to recover on the promise to reconvey or on the trust in spite of his
fraudulent intent.' 6 Apparently there is then less desire to punish the transferor
and comparatively greater aversion to allowing the unjust enrichment of the trans-
feree who is also tainted with fraud. In the instant case there was no existing creditor
to be defrauded; the expected claimant had not even begun suit 7 much less success-
fully obtained a judgment.' 8 Where the transfer is made on the basis of such
expected tort claims, the case is usually treated like those in which fraudulent
representation of possible claims, not actually based in fact, induced the conveyance
to the benefit of the transferee.' Moreover, in view of the fact that the intent was
to evade a possible future creditor, such a case is less to be considered as an actual
fraudulent conveyance than as a transaction only morally questionable.20 Yet re-
covery may sometimes be disallowed, even in such instances, in order to discourage
the making of the transfers. This practice is then said to be repugnant to public
policy because it permits discouragement of possible claims and facilitates placing
property beyond reach of the law. 0 But neither in the latter case nor in the case
of refusal to set aside transfers where there were existing creditors can such punish-
ment in a civil suit be truly justified. The penalty imposed is necessarily accidental
and not measured by the offense, and it inures to the benefit of the transferee, a
private party who is equally culpable. If a penalty is to be imposed for this typa
13. Britt v. Aylett, 11 Ark. 475 (1850); Sewell v. Norris, 128 Ga. 824, 58 S. E. 637
(1907).
14. Gest v. Gest, 117 Conn. 289, 300-301, 167 AUt. 909 (1934). Compare instant c=3
with respect to the duty of the court to apply the unclean hands doctrine regardle_3 of any
averment in the pleadings.
15. The American Surety Co. of N. Y. v. The Pacific Surety Co., 81 Conn. 252, 70
Atl. 584 (190S); CoNK. PRAcrcE Boox (1934) § 104.
16. Voflaro v. Gargano, 97 Conn. 275, 116 Atl. 179 (1922); Hoff v. Hoff, 105 Kan. 542,
189 Pac. 613 (1920); Tiedemann v. Tiedemann, 194 N. Y. Supp. 782 (1922); Rivera v.
White, 94 Tex. 538, 63 S. W. 125 (1901). Contra: Tantum v. Miller, 11 N. J. Eq. 551
(1858); Nunnally v. Stokes, 116 Va. 472, 82 S. E. 79 (1914).
17. Where a suit on a tort claim has been instituted but not brought to judgment
before the conveyance, the plaintiff is related back after judgment as an existent creditor
and the conveyance is fraudulent as to him. Rosenbaum v. Huebner, 277 Ill. 36, 115
N. E. 558 (1917); Harris v. Harris, 64 Va. 737 (1873); cf. Lange v. Semansh-e 103 N. J.
Eq. 538, 155 AUt. 783 (1931) (held that a person obtaining a judgment under the Death
Act became an existing creditor under the Fraudulent Conveyance Act notwithstanding
the fact that suit had not been instituted at the time of conveyance).
18. If the victim of the assault had brought civil suit and had recovered a judgment
even after the conveyance, she would nevertheless have been able to set -aide the con-
veyance as void. Davis v. Gates, 235 Fed. 192 (D. C. B1. D. Penn. 1916); Eastern Sash
and Door Co. v. Mleister, 99 N. J. Eq. 819, 134 Ad. 619 (Ch. 1926).
19. The element of the conviction for criminal assault is to be excluded from the de-
termination of unclean hands or fraudulent intent for purposes of the civil suit.
20. Carson v. Belles, 121 Ky. 294, 89 S. W. 203 (1905); Tantum v. Miller, 11 N. J.
Eq. 551 (1858).
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of conduct, it should be made criminal; and the fine, proportioned to the gravity of
the offense, should go to the state. 21 Reconveyance should be freely obtainable on
the legal merits of the case. By the granting of the reconveyance, moreover, sub-
sequent creditors would benefit in easier recovery from the transferor. In the
absence of such thoroughgoing reform, the punitive policy of the courts in all but
particularly flagrant instances might well be minimized. Thus in the principal case,
the fact that no creditors were actually injured would be ample justification for
allowing recovery.
REVOCATION OF PERSONAL FUNDED LIFE INSURANCE TRUST
A SUCCESSFUL business man who had a wife and two adult and two minor children
deposited securities representing the bulk of his savings with a trust company under
a deed of trust in which his wife was named as settlor and in which no power of
revocation was reserved. The trust instrument was drawn to effect a funded life
insurance trust plan conceived by an agent of the insurer with the agreement of the
husband and the trustee. It provided that the income of the securities should be used
to pay premiums for insurance on the husband's life, that upon his death the pro-
ceeds of the policy together with the securities in the fund were to be held by the
trustee for the benefit of the wife for life, then of her children for life, the corpus to
be distributed to their legatees, or in default of such to the insured's issue, or in de-
fault of both will and such issue, to the insured's brother or his issue. Subsequently,
impoverished by business reversals and no longer able to provide for his family, the
actual settlor together with his wife and the two adult children brought a bill in
equity against the trustee, the minor children, the brother and his children to ask
that the trust be set aside and the securities returned to the settlor. The guardian
ad litem of the infants and the trustee opposed the request in order to protect the
interests of the minors and to excuse the'trustee from future liability because of any
action taken. Although a court could not ordinarily set aside an active trust whose
expressed purpose could still be accomplished and all of whose beneficiaries were not
sui juris and of one mind, the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals did so.'
In the instant case the court did not attempt to distinguish the funded life in-
surance trust from the ordinary trust, but sought to justify its action by recourse to
previously accepted doctrines under which living trusts may be terminated or revoked.
That these doctrines justify the present action is questionable. The court discussed
the facts surrounding the creation of the trust to demonstrate the possibility that
because of mistake the deed of trust did not reflect the settlor's true intention. It
is true that existence of mistake might support the cancellation of the trust.2 How-
ever, to show such a mistake it must appear that the settlor had, when the trust was
created, a positive intent to make it revocable.8 In the present case it does not
21. See Wigmore, A Summary of Quasi-Contracts (1891) 25 Am. L. REV. 695, 712.
1. Reuther v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 116 N. J. Eq. 81, 172 Atl. 386 (1934).
2. Atkinson v. Atkinson, 157 Md. 648, 147 Atl. 662 (1929); Garnsay v. Mundy, 24
N. J. Eq. 243 (1873); Bell v. McCoin, 184 N. C. 117, 113 S. E. 561 (1922); Brlstor v.
Tasker, 135 Pa. 110, 19 AtI. 851 (1890); 1 PzmiR, TRUSTS (7th ed. 1929) § 104; Stevenson,
Revocation of Trust by the Settlor (1903) 57 CENT. L. J. 183.
3. Security Trust and Safe Deposit Co. v. Farrady, 9 Del. Ch. 306, 82 AtI. 24 (1912);
du Pont v. du Pont, 19 Del. Ch. 131, 164 AUt. 238 (1933); Love v. Love, 17 Hawaii 206
(1905); Brown v. Mercantile Trust Co., 87 Md. 377, 40 Atl. 256 (1898); Peck v. City
Trust Co., 104 Vt. 20, 156 AUt. 403 (1931); Toker v. Toker, 3 DeG. J. & S. 487 (Ch. 1863);
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appear that even the settlor claimed the existence of such intent. Thus inquiry along
this line is unproductive, for it is accepted that a secret or unexpressed intention is
of no significance4 Again, the court discussed the fact that subsequent events
proved the gift to be improvident as to the settlor. And although a court may set
aside an improvident gift obtained by undue influence when practically all of the
donor's estate has been given to a person in a relation of trust and confidence with
the donor, and where the donee occupies a position of dominance, the donor not
having had the benefit of competent independent advices here none of these re-
quirements is fulfilled. The husband apparently occupied the dominant position, had
the advice of persons whose interests were independent of the donee and had re-
maining at the time of his gift a profitable business as well as his home. Finally
the court sought to justify the revocation on the ground of mutual consent. It is
true that it is possible to dissolve a voluntary trust if all parties in interest O are
capable of consenting,7 do consent, and there is no longer any valid reason for pre-
serving the trust.8 But, in the absence of statute,0 where there are unborn or im-
see Melvin v. Hoffman, 290 Mo. 464, 494, 235 S. W. 107, 114 (1921). For an analysis
of the earlier cases, see (1874) 22 Amr. L. RrG. (13 N. S.) 351-354. Cf. Coolidge v. Loring,
235 Mass. 220, 126 N. E. 276 (1920) (claim of mistake as to legal effect; reformation of
trust deed refused).
4. du Pont v. du Pont, 19 Del. Ch. 131, 164 AUt. 238 (1933); cf. In re Tolerton, 163
Iowa 677, 150 N. W. 1051 (1915).
5. Ewing v. Wilson, 132 Ind. 223, 31 N. E. 64 (1892); Riddle v. Cutter, 49 Iowa 547
(1878); Smith v. Boyd, 61 N. J. Eq. 175, 47 At. 816 (1901); Slack v. Rees, 66 N. 3. Eq.
447, 59 At. 466 (1904); Albert v. Haeberly, 68 N. 3. Eq. 664, 61 At. 3S0 (1905); Pos*t
v. Hagan, 71 N. J. Eq. 234, 65 At. 1026 (1907); Pearce v. Stines, 79 N. J. Eq. 51, Go AtL
941 (1911); Hays v. Union Trust Co., 27 Misc. 240, 57 N. Y. Supp. 801 (Sup. Ct. 1899);
Bristor v. Tasker, 135 Pa. 110, 19 At. 851 (1890). For a review of many other New
Jersey cases on this rule, see In re Fulper, 99 N. J. Eq. 293, 132 AUt. 834 (1926). A gift
will not be set aside merely because it is improvident. Goodwin v. White, 59 Md. 503
(1882); James v. Aller, 68 N. J. Eq. 666, 62 At. 427 (1905); Farley v. First Camden Na-
tional Bank and Trust Co., 107 N. J. Eq. 272, 152 At. 245 (1930).
6. Where the trustee alone disputes the application for termination of the trust his
interest is deemed insufficient to block such termination. Eakle v. Ingram, 142 Cal. I, 75
Pac. 566 (1904); Aranyi v. Bankers' Trust Co., 201 App. Div. 706, 194 N. Y. Supp. 614
(Ist Dep't, 1922); Armistead's Executors v. Hartt, 97 Va. 316, 33 S. E. 616 (1899); sea
Slater v. Hurlbut, 146 Mass. 303, 314, 15 N. E. 790, 794 (1883).
7. Eakle v. Ingram, 142 Cal. 15, 75 Pac. 566 (1904); Anderson v. Williams, 262 l. 303,
104 N. E. 659 (1914); Matthews Administrator v. Thompson, 186 Mass. 14, 71 N. E. 93
(1904); Williams v. Sage, 180 App. Div. 1, 167 N. Y. Supp. 179 (2d Dep't, 1917);
Whittemore v. Equitable Trust Co., 250 N. Y. 298, 165 N. E. 454 (1929), rev'g 223
App. Div. 693, 229 N. Y. Supp. 440 (1st Dep't, 1928); Culbertson's Appeal, 76 Pa. 145
(1874); Cowie v. Strohmeyer, 150 Wis. 401, 136 N. W. 956, 137 N. W. 773 (1912); 2
PmRy, TRusts (7th ed. 1929) § 920.
8. Gray v. Union Trust Co. of San Francisco, 171 Cal. 637, 154 Pac. 305 (1915);
Fletcher v. Los Angeles Trust and Savings Bank, 182 Cal. 177, 187 Pac. 425 (1920);
Moor v. Vawter, 84 Cal. App. 678, 258 Pac. 622 (1927); Fidelity and Trust Co. v.
Gwynn, 206 Ky. 823, 268 S. W. 537 (1925). Cases where trusts have been terminated
include Booe v. Vinson, 104 Ark. 439, 149 S. W. 524 (1912); Black v. Bailey, 142 Ark
201, 218 S. W. 210 (1920); Smith v. Harrington, 86 Mass. 566 (1862); Bowditch v. Andrew,
90 Mass. 339 (1864); Inches v. Hill, 106 Mass. 575 (1871); Camden Safe Deposit and
Trust Co. v. Guerin, 89 N. 3. Eq. 556, 105 At. 189 (1918); Thebaud v. Schemerhorn, 30
Hun. 332 (N. Y. 1883).
9. N. C. CODE Ams. (Michie, 1931) § 996, applied in Stanback v. Citizens' National Bank,
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determined beneficiaries, termination will be refused.10 Here there were two exist-
ing cestuis who were legally incapable of consenting because of their minority and
three classes of beneficiaries that might be opened to admit persons not yet in
being:" namely, the children of the wife, the issue of the husband, and the issue of
the husband's brother. Although the court may have had the power to give the con-
sent of infant beneficiaries if the trust was improvident as to them and if by so doing
the court would promote their welfare,' 2 it is hardly possible for the same reason
to give consent on behalf of the cestuis not yet in being. As to the minor children
of the settlor it may be said that present poverty might be sufficiently harmful to
justify sacrifice of future benefit for present need. This the court did. But as to
unborn children of either husband or Wife, possibly by another marriage, that
argument is slightly less persuasive since they may not be born to circumstances of
poverty but could be born some time later when fortunes were reversed. And,
finally, as to the unborn issue of the husband's brother, the argument is entirely
inapplicable. They are not affected by the present fortune of the husband or his
family and could have no other than an adverse interest. For no reason that has been
disclosed the court did not investigate these points but instead reached its conclusion
by the simple expedient of disregarding them.
It is apparent that the facts of the instant case bring it more nearly within the
197 N. C. 292, 148 S. E. 313 (1929), noted in (1929) 8 N. C. L. REV. 92; McRae v. Com-
merce Union Trust Co., 199 N. C. 714, 155 S. E. 614 (1930). N. Y. Pims. Prop. LAW (1909)
§ 23, has been construed so that the term "persons beneficially interested" includes only per-
sons in being. Cram v. Walker, 173 App. Div. 804, 160 N. Y. Supp. 486 (1st Dep't, 1916);
Aranyi v. Bankers' Trust Co., 201 App. Div. 706, 194 N. Y. Supp. 614 (1st Dep't, 1922).
However, a recent case would seem to indicate that the point is still in doubt. See
Schoelikopf v. Marine Trust Co. of Buffalo, 242 App. Div. 11, 16, 272 N. Y. Supp, 613,
619 (4th Dep't 1934).
10. Hurt v. Gilmer, 59 App. D. C. 282, 40 F. (2d) 794 (1930); Underhll v. United
States Trust Co., 227 Ky. 444, 13 S. W. (2d) 502 (1929); In re Thurston, 154 Mass, 596,
29 N. E. 53 (1891); Isham v. Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Rr., 11 N. J. Eq. 227
(1856); Closset v. Burtchaell, 112 Ore. 585, 230 Pac. 554 (1924); Jones' Trust Estate, 284
Pa. 90, 130 Atl. 314 (1925); cf. Stewart v. Hamilton, 151 Tenn. 396, 270 S. W. 79 (1925);
2 PERRY, TRusTs (7th ed. 1929) § 920.
11. In the United States possibility of issue is deemed never to be extinct. Byers v.
Beddow, 106 Fla. 166, 142 So. 894 (1932), noted in (1933) 1 DuKE B. Ass'n J. 43; Allen v.
Allen's Trustees, 141 Ky. 689, 133 S. W. 543 (1911); Fletcher v. Los Angeles Trust and
Savings Bank, 182 Cal. 177, 187 Pac. 425 (1920); Note (1923) 23 CoL. L, R v. 50. An
exception has been made in questions of taxation. United States v. Provident Trust Co,
54 Sup. Ct. 389 (1934), noted in: (1934) 32 Micu. L. REv. 702; (1934) 47 HARv. L. R v.
1061; (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 1193.
In England trusts have been set aside on the assumption that the possibility of issue was
extinct. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 1 Dick. 374, 21 Eng. Reprint 314 (1764); Hamilton v.
Brickwood, 5 L. J. Rep. N. S. 144 (1836); Mackenzie v. King, 17 L. J. Eq. N. S, 448
(1848). For a list of many additional English cases, see Apgar's Case, 37 N. J. Eq. 501, n.
at 502 et seq. (1883).
12. One case, at least, implies that the courts have not the power to consent for con-
tingent beneficiaries. Underhill v. United States Trust Co., 227 Ky. 444, 13 S. W. (2d)
502 (1929). It is possible, however, to draw an analogy to a court's action in revoking a
gift to infant donees where the gift was not for their advantage, even though they had it
terms accepted it. See DeLevillain v. Evans, 39 Cal. 120 (1870); Youngblood v. Hoeffle,
201 S. W. 1057 (Tex. 1918).
doctrine of revocation by mutual consent than within the scope of the other doctrines
discussed. As a practical matter the court had before it all persons who could
express displeasure in the action requested, and whereas there is the possibility that
unborn persons could eventually object to a present revocation, such a contingency
seems less real than possible. Under somewhat analogous circumstances courts have
reached otherwise impossible conclusions by invoking the doctrine of representation
-whereby members of a class may be said to give consent on behalf of all possible
members of the same class.13 It has even been suggested that courts could go so
far as to allow a trustee to do this for them. 14 Usually, however, where representa-
tion has been allowed the interests thus foreclosed have been remote and the action
taken less drastic than in the instant case.15 Thus where owners of present interests
wish to change the nature of the property held under limitations and are unable
safely to do so without the consent of all possible takers, a court may permit consent
by representation of unborn takers, which is nearly the same as to say that in such
instances consent is not necessary where even an expression of attitude cannot be
obtained and where no objection to the action can be seen. In the recent Property
Restatement of the American Law Institute this doctrine is stated as general law and
is stated to apply to a situation such as the one before the courL And although,
but for the authority of the Restatement, application of the doctrine in the present
case would be a step in advance of its previous use, nevertheless recognition of that
doctrine would have given a legal sanction to the court's action and would have
expressed in doctrine what the court has here done in fact. But even had the court
extended the doctrine of representation to apply to the case in hand it would have
left unresolved the further problem of whether, if some of the beneficiaries or their
representatives had opposed the revocation, the peculiar nature of funded life in-
surance trusts would have sufficed to remove them from the operation of the usual
principles governing the revocation of living trusts.17
Certainly a contrary result would have been unfortunate. Personal funded life
insurance trusts are of comparatively recent origin, arising out of an application of
trust principles to insurance contracts and motivated by the desire to achieve future
security for the beneficiaries of the policies.28 Though such a trust has much in
common with other trusts, it also has individual characteristics which set it apart.
Under it, income-producing securities are placed in trust and the income thereon is
13. REsTATrmrxx, PRoPERTY (Tent. Draft, 1934) §§ 225, 226 (a). Cf. McCampbell v.
Mason, 151 ]11. 500, 38 N. E. 672 (1894) (mortgage foreclosure); Whallen v. Kellner, 31
Ky. Law. Rep. 1285, 104 S. W. 1018 (1907) (appointment of new trustee); Wayne v.
Brumley, 190 Ky. 488, 227 S. W. 996 (1921) (sale of land to pay debts); Nanrelk Realty
Co. v. Kiernan, 106 Afisc. 430, 174 N. Y. Supp. 726 (Sup. Ct. 1919) (judicial sale); Barber
v. Barber, 195 N. C. 711, 143 S. E. 469 (1928) (partition).
14. RESTATEmENT, PROPzRTY (Tent. Draft, 1934) § 228.
15. Cases cited in note 13, supra.
16. RESTATEumT, PaoPERar (Tent. Draft, 1934) § 222, comment b. In one cS;,
Underhill v. United States Trust Co., 227 Ky. 444, 13 S. W. (2d) 502 (1929), the settlor
and the life tenant claimed that the latter represented the interests of the remaindermen,
her as yet unborn children. The court refused to terminate the trust, holding that a life
tenant's interest was antagonistic to the interest of a taker in fee and, therefore, the life
tenant could not represent the remaindermen.
17. The doctrine of representation would be of no avail in the situation where one
cestui, however remote, refused to consent.
18. Cf. Fraser, Personal Life Insurance Trusts in New York (1930) 16 Com'. L. Q. 19;
Hanna, Some Legal Aspects of Life Insurance Trusts (1930) 78 U. or PA. L. REv. 346.
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used to pay the premiums on policies of life insurance. Although that income, for
purposes of taxation, may be taxable to the settlor or the beneficiary as income used
for the benefit of the one or the other, the important fact remains that no person has
a present right to the use of that income until the death of the insured and thus
nothing is available to mitigate the effects of a sudden reversal of fortune. In the
ordinary case of a living trust the income is presently enjoyed by the beneficiaries
thereof, and the operation of the trust results in protecting them from the effects of
adverse conditions because of the availability of the income for use in alleviating the
effect of a loss of all but the trust fund. Only in the unusual case of an accumula-
tion in which income is added to principal and its expenditure prevented until the
death of the settlor would an analogy be found in the field of living trusts.19
Although the immediate motive of the settlor of such a trust may be, as here, to
assure the financial independence of his family after his death, there is present,
though behind the gift, the broader purpose of the general welfare of his family.
Providing for them after his decease is but one step in his program of insuring their
welfare both before and after his death. When this real purpose behind all personal
funded life insurance trusts is remembered, it is not clear that there should be any
necessity of attempting to find intent, consent, or representation. Because of the
unusual nature of the funded life insurance trust it might well appear that it should,
as a matter of policy, be revocable by a court when circumstances have so altered as
to defeat a fundamental purpose motivating its creation. To make such revocation
depend upon the consefit of beneficiaries who are remote, and who are not neces-
sarily affected by the conditions that make the continuance of the trust undesirable
as to the settlor and the immediate beneficiaries does not face squarely the issue
raised by this particular type of trust. It is reasonable to feel that even had the
brother and his children here opposed the revocation, it should have been granted.
Nor is it necessarily going too far to reason that under some circumstances such a
trust should be revocable even though consent be withheld by an adult child of the
settlor. Legislative action to meet the question would either have to make the trust
revocable at the settlor's option, or would have to require the existence of certain
conditions under which the trust should be set aside. The first is undesirable as
going further than the problem requires and would largely change the taxability of
such trusts, for a revocable trust is subject to succession taxes upon the death of the
settlor. The second suggestion would still require resort to court supervision to
determine the existence of the necessary conditions. No reason appears why a court
should not of its own choice exercise discretion in such a limited field. It is neither
unusual nor unknown that a court of equity should have the burden of determining
whether or not it would be for the welfare of the family to terminate such a trust,
for even in the matter of the ordinary trust where all the interested parties consent
to its termination the power of the court to dissolve it is discretionary and will be
19. Such an accumulation would be illegal in New York, California, Indiana, North
Dakota and South Dakota, where accumulations are permitted only during the period of
the minority of a person who would be a beneficiary. Whether in those states a funded
life insurance trust would be considered an unlawful accumulation was at one time the
source of much controversy. Bogert, Funded Insurance Trusts and the Rule against Ac.
cumulations (1924) 9 CoRN. L. Q. 113; Hanna, op. cit. supra note 18, at 360-373 [criticizing
the reasoning in In re Hartman's Estate, 126 Misc. 862, 215 N. Y. Supp. 802 (Surr. Ct.
1926), where funded life insurance trust was held not to constitute an accumulation];
Fraser, op. cit. supra note 18, at 24-25. By amendment in 1927 to the Personal Property
Law, New York excluded funded life insurance trusts from consideration as accumula-
tions. N. Y. PERs. PRoP. LAw (1909) § 16, as amended by Laws 1927, c. 681.
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used only in proper cases.20 Nor is it unknown for a court to give consideration to
the general intent of the settlor as distinguished from the specific purpose of the
gift. Such conduct is customary in the application of the doctrine of cy-pres to sus-
tain charitable gifts where the specific scheme of the testator has been rendered im-
practical by changes in law or circumstances and the general purpose of the gift is
discernible. 2 ' Furthermore, the court would here be subject to restrictions of fact,
if not of doctrine, in that extreme reversal of the settlor's fortunes would be a con-
dition precedent to court action, and the reversal would have to be such as to af-
fect seriously the more immediate beneficiaries.
20. Gray v. Union Trust Co. of San Francisco, 171 Cal. 637, 154 Pac. 305 (1915). For
situations in which the court considered termination proper, see cases cited in note 8, supa.
21. Scott, Education and the Dead Hand (1920) 34 HAnV. L. REv. 1; cf. Jackson v.
Phillips, 96 Mass. 539 (1867); Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Williams, 50 R. L 335,
148 At. 189 (1929).
Principles simila to those of the doctrine of cy-pres have been applied to private trusts
where a change in circumstances has made it impossible to achieve the main intent of the
settlor by exact conformity to the terms of a trust. Bankers' Trust Co. v. Grelns, 103
Conn. 259, 142 At. 796 (1928); Russell v. Russell, 109 Conn. 187, 145 Atl. 648 (1929);
Matter of Pulitzer, 139 Misc. 575, 249 N. Y. Supp. 87 (Surr. Ct. 1931). See alho Scott,
Deviation from the Terms of a Trust (1931) 44 HAnv. L. Rxv. 1025.
